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The Newly-Enacted CPLR 3408 for 
 Easing the Mortgage Foreclosure 
 Crisis: Very Good Steps, but not 
 Legislatively Perfect 
 
Hon. Mark C. Dillon* 
 
Introduction 
 
There was only one mortgage foreclosure action filed in 
Putnam County, New York, in 2005.1  Three years later, in 
2008, there were fifty-three mortgage foreclosure actions filed 
in the same county,2 representing a 5,200% increase in 
foreclosures in three years.  In Orange County, New York, 
eight mortgage foreclosure actions were filed in 2005.3  In 2008, 
the number of new mortgage foreclosure actions rose to an even 
1,200,4 representing a 14,200% increase in such filings.  In 
Westchester County during the same time frame, the number 
of foreclosures rose from 565 to 1,676,5 which is not as stunning 
as the increases that occurred in Putnam and Orange Counties, 
but still more than a threefold increase.  The crisis in subprime 
lending that developed in 2007, 2008, and 2009 prompted a 
 
* Mark C. Dillon (Colgate University B.A., New York University M.A., 
Fordham Law School J.D.) is a Justice of the Appellate Division of the New 
York State Supreme Court, Second Judicial Department.  He is also an 
Adjunct Professor of New York Practice at Fordham Law School, where he 
was voted by the school’s student body as Adjunct Professor of the Year in 
2009.  The author acknowledges the assistance of the following persons 
involved in the acquisition of certain statistical information used for this 
article: Chief Administrative Judge Ann T. Pfau, Paul Lewis, Esq. of the New 
York State Office of Court Administration, Administrative Judge for the 
Ninth Judicial District Alan D. Scheinkman, and Nancy Barry, Esq. of his 
office. 
1. Statistics provided by the New York State Unified Court System, 
Foreclosure Cases Filed, by county (2005-2008). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
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significant increase in foreclosures in many counties in the 
State of New York.  Nationally, 860,000 homes were sold in 
foreclosure in 2008.6  In the third quarter of 2009 alone, 
foreclosures reached a record national high of 937,840 homes 
that received a default notice, an auction notice, or that were 
repossessed by a bank.7 
The New York State Legislature endeavored to cope with 
the dramatic increase in mortgage foreclosures by enacting a 
variety of statutes that are known, in omnibus form, as the 
Subprime Residential Loan and Foreclosure Laws.8  The 
statutes included in the omnibus legislation are RPL 265-b, 
RPAPL 1302, 1303 and 1304, Banking Law 6-l, 6-m, 590-b and 
595-599, GOL 5-301(3), and, as central to this Article, CPLR 
3408.9  CPLR 3408 is, therefore, a piece of a broader statutory 
mosaic. 
This Article examines the newly-enacted CPLR 3408 as it 
pertains to foreclosure actions filed in the State of New York.  
As will be shown below, CPLR 3408 fulfills a worthwhile 
purpose of requiring early settlement conferences with the trial 
courts, in the hope of preserving family home ownership, 
particularly for minorities and the poor, who are, statistically, 
most affected by the crisis in subprime mortgages.10  As will 
also be shown below, however, the language of the legislation 
presents minor procedural flaws that can be rectified by judges 
 
6. Foreclosures More than Doubled in 2008, MSNBC, Jan. 15, 2009, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28663624/. 
7. Les Christie, Foreclosures: Worst Three Months of All Time, CNN, Oct. 
15, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/15/real_estate/foreclosure_crisis_ 
deepens/?postversion=2009101507.  Care must be taken when examining 
foreclosure statistics, as some reported statistics focus upon only the number 
of homes actually sold at foreclosure auctions, whereas others—including 
those at issue here—include homeowners who merely receive default notices 
and auction notices, which precede foreclosure sales. 
8. 2008 N.Y. Laws ch. 472.  See also LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Novetti, 
889 N.Y.S.2d 506, No. 6535-08, 2009 WL 1810511, at *2 (Sup. Ct. June 15, 
2009) (unreported disposition); Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Edsall, 880 N.Y.S.2d 
877, No. 3523-07, 2009 WL 175029, at *3 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 2009) (unreported 
disposition). 
9. 2008 N.Y. Laws ch. 472.  See also Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 2009 WL 
175029, at *3. 
10. See Michael Powell & Janet Roberts, Minorities Hit Hardest as New 
York Foreclosures Rise, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2009, at A1.  See also Manny 
Fernandez, In Confronting the Foreclosure Crisis, A Bill Strikes a Balance, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2008, at A25. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/3
2010] THE NEWLY-ENACTED CPLR 3408 857 
who are sensitive to the overriding purpose and intent of the 
statute.  This Article is written with the hope and expectation 
that its subject matter is legally, economically, and socially 
timely. 
 
I. The Particulars of CPLR 3408 as Originally Enacted 
 
An appropriate starting point is the language of CPLR 
3408.  The statute, which does not have a predecessor,11 
became effective on August 5, 2008.12  Because the statute is 
relatively new, as of this writing, only a limited body of case 
law has been generated at the trial level.  Few issues involving 
CPLR 3408 have had sufficient time to percolate to any of the 
state’s four Appellate Divisions for statutory interpretation and 
application. 
The original language of CPLR 3408 reads, in pertinent 
part, 
 
(a) In any residential foreclosure action involving 
a high-cost home loan consummated between 
January first, two thousand three and 
 
11. While there is no statutory predecessor to CPLR 3408, the New York 
State Judiciary was ahead of the Legislature in recognizing the potential 
value of early settlement conferences in residential foreclosure actions.  A 
report entitled RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES: PROMOTING EARLY 
COURT INTERVENTION was issued in June 2008 by then-Chief Judge Judith 
Kaye and by Chief Administrative Judge Ann Pfau.  The report recognized 
the significant spike in residential foreclosure actions filed in the State of 
New York and the effect of foreclosures upon families, neighborhoods, banks, 
and the economy.  It summarized the creation of a pilot Early Foreclosure 
Conference Part in Queens County where, under local rules, homeowner 
defendants could request, pursuant to written notice served with the 
summons and complaint, a court conference.  The conference was to be held 
within sixty days from the filing of a Request for Judicial Intervention, which 
was to be purchased at the time proof of service was filed with the clerk of the 
court.  The purpose of the conference was to streamline foreclosure litigations 
for lenders and to encourage settlements between the parties.  N.Y. STATE 
UNIFIED COURT SYS., RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES: PROMOTING 
EARLY COURT INTERVENTION, at 2-4 [hereinafter N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT 
SYS. Report], available at 
http://www.nycourts.gov/whatsnew/pdf/ResidentialForeclosure6-08.pdf.  The 
enactment of CPLR 3408 two months later, however, caused the pilot 
program to be subsumed by the procedures required by the state statute. 
12. 2008 N.Y. Laws ch. 472, § 3; Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 2009 WL 
175029, at *4. 
3
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September first, two thousand eight, or a 
subprime or nontraditional home loan, as those 
terms are defined under section thirteen hundred 
four of the real property actions and proceedings 
law, in which the defendant is a resident of the 
property subject to foreclosure, the court shall 
hold a mandatory conference within sixty days 
after the date when proof of service is filed with 
the country clerk, or on such adjourned date as 
has been agreed to by the parties, for the purpose 
of holding settlement discussions pertaining to 
the relative rights and obligations of the parties 
under the mortgage loan documents, including, 
but not limited to determining whether the 
parties can reach a mutually agreeable 
resolution to help the defendant avoid losing his 
or her home, and evaluating the potential for a 
resolution in which payment schedules or 
amounts may be modified or other workout 
options may be agreed to, and for whatever other 
purposes the court deems appropriate. 
 
There are several words and phrases in CPLR 3408(a) that 
are noteworthy.  These include the stated purpose of the 
statute, the types of mortgages and defendants within its 
scope, and its chronological and procedural requirements.  
Each is discussed below. 
 
A. The Stated Purpose and Intent of CPLR 3408 
 
It is striking that within the original single paragraph of 
CPLR 3408(a), the terms ―settlement,‖ ―resolution,‖ and 
―agreed to‖ appear a total of five times.  The terms underscore 
the purpose and legislative intent of the statute.  CPLR 3408 
was enacted to foster the early settlement of foreclosure actions 
as a means of preserving home ownership and to mitigate the 
subprime credit crisis, through the mandated auspices of the 
courts.13  The law requires that a conference be conducted in 
 
13. See Sponsor’s Mem., Bill Jacket, L.2008, ch. 472, available at 
http://image.iarchives.nysed.gov/images/images/142344.pdf.  See also LaSalle 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/3
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foreclosure actions between the parties and the court, for the 
purpose of, inter alia, determining whether the parties can 
resolve the litigation and keep families in their homes by 
adjusting payment schedules or the amounts due.14  Previously, 
there had been no such settlement conference requirement in 
New York.  Professor David Siegel notes that since the state is 
unable to alter, ex post facto, the laws that were in effect when 
mortgage transactions were undertaken, a settlement 
conference between the parties under the auspices of the court 
may be the next best alternative to minimize the number of 
home foreclosures.15  
Any adjustments that could be made in payment schedules 
or amounts due as a result of the conference benefit, in the first 
instance, the defendants being foreclosed upon.  A 2009 report 
of the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University 
School of Law has identified the secondary benefits arising out 
of foreclosure settlements, beyond the obvious benefit of 
preserving families in their homes and communities.16  These 
secondary benefits are to neighborhoods whose property values 
decline as a result of foreclosures,17 municipalities that lose a 
portion of their local tax revenue,18 higher crime rates that 
have been linked to foreclosure rates, 19 and lenders that often 
 
Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2009 WL 1810511, at *2; David D. Siegel, Legislature 
Mandates Settlement Conference in Residential Foreclosure Actions in Effort 
to Ease Subprime Mortgage Crisis, SIEGEL’S PRAC. REV., Sept. 2008, at 3, 
available at 201 SIEGELPR 3 (WestLaw); Abby Tolchinsky & Ellie 
Wertheim, Bringing Borrowers and Lenders Together Under Foreclosure Law, 
N.Y. L.J., May 8, 2009, at 3. 
14. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(a) (McKinney 2009).  See also Siegel, Practice 
Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 7B, CPLR C3408. 
15. Siegel, supra note 13. 
16. MELANCA CLARK & MAGGIE BARRON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
FORECLOSURES: A CRISIS IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION 7-8 (2009), available at 
http://brennan.3cdn.net/a5bf8a685cd0885f72_s8m6bevkx.pdf. 
17. Id. at 7-8 (citing Jenny Schuetz, Vicki Been & Ingrid Gould Ellen, 
Neighborhood Effects of Concentrated Mortgage Foreclosures 17 (N.Y.U. 
Center for Law & Econ., Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper 
No. 08-41, Sept. 18, 2008)).  The paper correlates the proximity of 
foreclosures to reductions in home sales prices in the same areas. 
18. Id. at 8 (citing generally WILLIAM C. APGAR & MARK DUDA, 
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE MUNICIPAL IMPACT OF TODAY’S MORTGAGE 
FORECLOSURE BOOM (May 11, 2005)). 
19. Id. (citing Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The Impact of Single-
Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Neighborhood Crime, 21 HOUSING STUD. 
851, 862 (2006)). 
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lose money from the foreclosures.20 
 
B. The Mortgages to Which CPLR 3408 Originally Applied 
 
A second noteworthy aspect of CPLR 3408(a) is the 
statute’s built-in definition of the types of mortgage foreclosure 
actions for which the mandatory settlement conferences 
originally applied.  Three types of applicable mortgages were 
specified.21  One was the ―subprime‖ loan as defined by RPAPL 
1304.22  A second was the ―nontraditional home loan‖ as 
defined by RPAPL 1304.23  The third was the ―high-cost home 
loan‖ as defined by Banking Law 6-l.24  The statutory language 
suggests that care was taken in isolating the mortgages that 
are within the scope of the statute.  These three types of 
mortgages are more susceptible to default during times of 
declining housing values, as they represent the greatest 
expense to the riskiest of borrowers.  The settlement conference 
mandated by the original version of CPLR 3408 did not apply 
to actions involving a mortgage other than one of the types 
specified in the statute.25  Accordingly, ―traditional‖ home loans 
were not within the defined scope of the statute. 
The three mortgages identified in CPLR 3408 have 
different meanings.  A ―subprime‖ loan is defined as a home 
loan consummated between January 1, 2003 and September 1, 
2008 secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on real estate upon 
which there is located, or is to be located, one or more 
structures intended to be used principally for occupation by one 
to four families, including the borrower, and for which the 
terms of the loan exceed a ―threshold‖ defined in RPAPL 
 
20. Id. (citing PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, DEFAULTING ON THE DREAM: 
STATES RESPOND TO AMERICA’S FORECLOSURE CRISIS 2, 11 (2008); 
Homeownership Preservation Foundation, About Foreclosure, Common 
Myths, 
http://www.995hope.org/about-foreclosure/common-myths/ (last visited Feb. 
14, 2010)). 
21. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(a) (McKinney 2009). 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id.; N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-l(1)(d). 
25. See Emigrant Mortgage Co., Inc. v. Turk, 895 N.Y.S.2d 722 (App. 
Div. 2010); Trustco Bank v. Alexander, 886 N.Y.S.2d 69, No. 2008-3351, 2009 
WL 1425247, at *1 (Sup. Ct. May 12, 2009) (unreported disposition). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/3
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1304(5)(d).26  For first lien mortgage loans, the threshold is 
exceeded when the annual percentage rate of the home loan, at 
the time of consummation, is three or more percentage points 
over the yield on treasury securities with comparable periods of 
maturity, measured as of the fifteenth day of the month in 
which the loan was consummated.27  For subordinate mortgage 
liens, the threshold is five or more percentage points over the 
treasury security yields.28  Subprime home loans do not include 
transactions to finance the initial construction of a dwelling, 
temporary or ―bridge‖ loans with a term of twelve months or 
less, or home equity lines of credit.29  If any home loan offers 
percentage terms that are lower during an initial or 
introductory period, with a higher rate after the end of such 
period, the threshold is determined by using the rate that 
becomes applicable after the initial or introductory period.30 
A ―nontraditional home loan‖ is defined as a payment 
option adjustable rate mortgage, or an interest only mortgage, 
consummated between January 1, 2003 and September 1, 
2008.31 
A ―high-cost home loan‖ is defined in Banking Law 6-l.  Its 
definition is more complicated than the definitions of subprime 
and nontraditional home loans.  A high-cost home loan is a 
separately-defined ―home loan‖32 that presents the additional 
component of being ―high-cost.‖  A ―home loan‖ is defined in 
Banking Law 6-l(1)(e) as a debt incurred by a natural person 
for personal, family, or household purposes, secured by a 
mortgage or deed of trust upon New York State real estate that 
is used as a principal dwelling for one to four families.33  A 
―home loan‖ must also reflect a principal amount that does not 
exceed the conforming size limit for a comparable dwelling, 
established periodically by the federal national mortgage 
association.34  Home loans do not include ―reverse mortgage‖ 
 
26. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1304(5)(c). 
27. Id. § 1304(5)(d). 
28. Id.  See also Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. v. Hughes, 866 N.Y.S.2d 
860, 862-63 (Sup. Ct. 2008). 
29. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1304(5)(c). 
30. Id. § 1304(5)(d). 
31. Id. § 1304(5)(e); Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 866 N.Y.S.2d at 862. 
32. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-l(1)(e).  
33. Id. § 6-l(1)(e)(ii)-(v). 
34. Id. § 6-l(1)(e)(i). 
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transactions.35  A home loan becomes ―high-cost‖ when the 
terms of the loan exceed a threshold defined by Banking Law 6-
l(1)(g).36  This threshold is met for first lien mortgage loans 
when the annual percentage rate of the home loan at the time 
of consummation exceeds ―eight percentage points over the 
yield on treasury securities having comparable periods of 
maturity to the loan maturity measured as of the fifteenth day 
of the month immediately preceding the month in which the 
application for the extension of credit is received by the 
lender.‖37  For subordinate mortgage liens, the threshold is 
nine percentage points above the treasury security yields.38  As 
with subprime loans, if any home loan offers percentage terms 
that are lower during an initial or introductory period, with a 
higher rate after the end of such period, the threshold is 
determined by using the rate applicable after the initial or 
introductory period.39  As an alternative to the threshold, a 
home loan will become ―high-cost‖ if total points and fees 
exceed 5% of the total amount of the loan for loans of $50,000 
or more; or 6% of the total loan amount of $50,000 or more and 
the loan is a purchase money loan guaranteed by either the 
Federal Housing Administration or the Veterans 
Administration; or the greater of 6% or $1,500, if the total loan 
amount is less than $50,000.40 
 
35. Id. § 6-l(1)(e). 
36. Id. § 6-l(1)(d).  See generally LaSalle Bank, N.A. II v. Shearon, 881 
N.Y.S.2d 599, 604-06 (Sup. Ct. 2009). 
37. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-l(1)(g)(i). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. § 6-l(1)(g)(ii).  The statute provides for a deduction of up to two 
bona fide loan discount points payable by the borrower, if the interest rate 
from which the loan interest rate is discounted does not exceed by more than 
one percentage point the yield on U.S. treasury securities having comparable 
maturity measured from the fifteenth day of the month immediately 
preceding the month in which the application was received, id. § 6-
l(1)(g)(ii)(1), and all bona fide loan discount points funded directly or 
indirectly through grants from federal, state, or local agencies or tax exempt 
organizations, id. § 6-l(1)(g)(ii)(2).  Certain high-cost home loan practices are 
expressly prohibited by the BANKING LAW, including acceleration provisions 
absent default by the borrower, id. § 6-l(2)(a)), balloon payments that are 
more than twice as large as the average of earlier scheduled payments, id. § 
6-l(2)(b), negative amortization by which regular periodic payments cause an 
increase in the principal balance, id. § 6-l(2)(c), interest rate increases as a 
result of the borrower’s default, id. § 6-l(2)(d), the application of more than 
two periodic payments paid in advance from the borrower’s loan proceeds, id. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/3
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The three types of mortgages underlying the 2008 version 
of CPLR 3408(a) had one additional significant element in 
common: namely, that they apply to residential mortgages 
only.41  Commercial mortgages are noticeably absent from the 
language of CPLR 3408, RPAPL 1304, and Banking Law 6-l.  
The language of CPLR 3408 suggests that the legislature’s 
intent of curbing mortgage foreclosures is directed only at 
residential home ownership, and does not extend to 
businesses.42 
No cases have yet been reported where parties have 
conclusively litigated whether the mortgage at issue was 
within, or without, the scope of CPLR 3408.  One case that 
came close was Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. v. Hughes, in 
which the plaintiff and the defendant differed on the question 
of how the mortgage between them should be classified for 
purposes of CPLR 3408.43  The defendant argued that the 
mortgage was a nontraditional home mortgage, whereas the 
 
§ 6-l(2)(e), fees for certain loan modifications, renewals, extensions or 
amendments, id. § 6-l(2)(f), oppressive mandatory arbitration clauses, id. § 6-
l(2)(g), the financing of insurance or other defined products, id. § 6- l(2)(h), 
loan ―flipping,‖ id. § 6-l(2)(i), the refinancing of special mortgages, id. § 6-
l(2)(j), lending without verification of the borrower’s ability to repay, id. § 6-
l(2)(k), lending without counseling disclosure, id. § 6-l(2)(l), the financing of 
points and fees, id. § 6-l(2)(m), the payment of home improvement contractors 
from loan proceeds, id. § 6-l(2)(n), the encouragement of the borrower’s 
default, id. § 6-l(2)(o), payments to mortgage brokers other than for goods and 
facilities actually furnished or services actually performed, id. § 6-l(2)(p), 
points and fees for refinancing a high-cost home loan to a new high-cost home 
loan, id. § 6- l(2)(q), prepayment penalties, id. § 6-l(2)(r), abusive yield spread 
premiums, id. § 6-l(2)(s), the non-collection by the lender of tax and insurance 
escrow for loans to be consummated after July 1, 2010, id. § 6-l(2)(t), the non-
disclosure by the lender of taxes and insurance, id. § 6-l(2)(u), and ―teaser 
rates‖ having a duration of less than six months, id. § 6-l(2)(v).  The statute 
provides for penalties in the form of consequential and incidental damages, 
civil penalties, and attorneys fees, as well as equitable and injunctive relief, 
in the event that violations by lenders are proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  Id. §§ 6-l(7) – (11).  See generally LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Shearon, 
850 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 2008).  
41. See Governor’s Program Bill Mem., Summary of Provisions, Bill 
Jacket, L.2008, ch. 472. 
42. See Siegel, supra note 13; Governor’s Program Bill Mem., Summary 
of Provisions, Bill Jacket, L.2008, ch. 472; Press Release, Governor David A. 
Paterson, Governor Paterson Signs Comprehensive Reforms to Address 
Foreclosure Crisis (Aug. 5, 2008), available at 
http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/press_0805081.html. 
43. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. v. Hughes, 866 N.Y.S.2d 860, 862-63 
(Sup. Ct. 2008). 
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plaintiff contended that the mortgage could instead qualify as a 
subprime home loan.44  The Supreme Court, Essex County, did 
not need to reach this issue, as both types of mortgages 
qualified under CPLR 3408, and as the dispositive issue 
between the parties was whether the defendant resided in the 
subject property as to trigger the settlement conference 
requirement of the statute.45 
Another case that touched upon the issue of whether a 
residential mortgage fell within the scope of CPLR 3408 is 
Butler Capital Corp. v. Cannistra.46  In Butler Capital Corp., 
the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a judgment 
on default, as the plaintiff’s moving papers failed to establish 
that the loan at issue was a subprime, non-traditional, or high-
cost home loan within the mandates of CPLR 3408.47 
It is predicted here that before long, courts will be asked to 
resolve disputes between parties in foreclosure actions on the 
question of whether a particular loan, subject to the 2008 
version of CPLR 3408, falls within or without the scope of 
CPLR 3408 and its mandatory settlement conference 
requirement. 
The statute’s remedies have been held to be unavailable to 
defendants who are actually engaged in duplicitous mortgage 
schemes.48 
 
C. The Necessity of Defendants Residing at the Mortgaged 
Premises 
 
A third noteworthy aspect of CPLR 3408 is its residency 
requirement.  CPLR 3408 specifically applies to actions where 
―the defendant is a resident of the property subject to 
foreclosure.‖49  On the face of the statute, a borrower who is not 
 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 863. 
46. 891 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 2009). 
47. Id. at 243. 
48. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Edsall, 880 N.Y.S.2d 877, No. 
3523-07, 2009 WL 175029, at *4 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 2009) (unreported 
disposition). 
49. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(a) (McKinney 2009) (emphasis added); U.S. 
Bank, N.A. v. Flynn, No. 2010-20093, 2010 WL 936224, at *4 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 
12, 2010). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/3
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a resident of the property being foreclosed upon is not entitled 
to the settlement conference mandated by CPLR 3408.  The 
issue of the borrower’s residence was important in Indymac 
Federal Bank FSB v. Black.50  In Indymac, the defendant 
entered into a subprime home loan, defaulted in her payment 
obligations, and was served with process in the plaintiff’s 
foreclosure action in Florida.51  The plaintiff argued that the 
defendant was not entitled to a settlement conference under 
CPLR 3408 as she had been located in Florida when process 
was served and was not, therefore, a current resident of the 
property being foreclosed upon.52  The Supreme Court, 
Rensselaer County, disagreed, noting that the mere service of 
process in Florida was insufficient evidence, in and of itself, to 
demonstrate that the subject premises in New York was not 
the defendant’s principal residence.53  By implication, had the 
plaintiff presented the court with stronger evidence that the 
defendant’s residence had in fact been relocated to Florida, the 
court may have reached a different conclusion as to whether 
the defendant qualified for a mandatory settlement conference. 
One issue that was missed in Indymac is that under New 
York law, a party may simultaneously have more than one 
residence.  A party may have only one ―domicile,‖ which is 
physical presence in one state location with the intention that 
the state be an actual and permanent home, but may have 
multiple ―residences,‖ which is a looser term dependant upon a 
person’s significant connections with states.54  CPLR 3408 does 
not refer to a defendant’s domicile, or even to a defendant’s 
―principal‖ residence, but instead requires that the defendant 
merely be ―a resident of the property subject to foreclosure.‖  
Accordingly, in a case such as Indymac, the defendant could be 
a ―resident‖ of the New York property subject to foreclosure 
even if that same defendant also owned a home in another 
state (such as Florida), and was found there for service of 
process. 
According to one court, the language of CPLR 3408 does 
 
50. 880 N.Y.S.2d 224, No. 226806, 2009 WL 211787 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 23, 
2009) (unreported disposition). 
51. Id. at *1-2. 
52. Id. at *2. 
53. Id. 
54. See, e.g., Antone v. Gen. Motors Corp., 64 N.Y.2d 20, 28 (1984). 
11
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not expressly address whether a foreclosure defendant must 
reside at the property when the mortgage contract is executed, 
or, rather, when the foreclosure action is commenced.55  This 
difference is potentially significant.  In Accredited Home 
Lenders, Inc. v. Hughes, the defendants entered into a 
subprime home loan for property in Essex County, New York 
and defaulted on their payment obligations.56  The defendants 
were residing in New Jersey, either permanently or 
temporarily, when the foreclosure action was later 
commenced.57  The plaintiff argued that CPLR 3408 was 
inapplicable, as the defendants’ residency in New Jersey meant 
that they were not residents of the New York property that was 
subject to foreclosure.58  The Supreme Court disagreed, 
focusing on the language of RPAPL 1304 that is incorporated 
into CPLR 3408, which defines subprime and nontraditional 
home loans.59  The court noted that under RPAPL 1304, a 
default notice must be transmitted to the borrower by 
registered or certified mail and by regular mail at least ninety 
days prior to the commencement of any foreclosure action, and 
that such notice must be sent to the address of the mortgaged 
premises or to the borrower’s last known address, if different.60  
The court, therefore, viewed RPAPL 1304 as acknowledging 
that borrowers of subprime and nontraditional home loans 
might not live at the mortgaged property at the time 
foreclosure actions are commenced, which is ambiguous when 
juxtaposed against the language of CPLR 3408 that requires, 
in present-tense language, that borrowers reside at the 
mortgaged property.61  Finding the statute ambiguous, the 
court stated that the legislative intent of CPLR 3408 was to 
expansively benefit borrowers subject to subprime and 
nontraditional home loans, other than owners of second homes 
 
55. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. v. Hughes, 866 N.Y.S.2d 860, 863 
(Sup. Ct. 2008). 
56. Id. at 862. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 863. 
60. Id.  See also N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1304(1), (2) (McKinney 
2009). 
61. Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1304(2) with N.Y. C.P.L.R. 
3408(a). 
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or investment properties.62  The court held that CPLR 3408 
was not intended to require borrowers to remain at their 
mortgaged premises while foreclosure actions were being 
prepared or were pending.63  The court, therefore, concluded 
that even if the defendants had relocated their residence to 
New Jersey, they were entitled to the mandatory settlement 
conference conferred by CPLR 3408.64 
The reasoning used by the court in Accredited Home 
Lenders is arguably incorrect.  Courts must interpret the 
meaning of statutes by looking at the plain language used by 
the legislature, as it is the clearest indicator of statutory 
intent.65  Only when a statute is ambiguous will courts 
examine the legislative history underlying the statute for 
evidence of the legislature’s intent.66  Here, the language of 
CPLR 3408(a) speaks purely in the present tense; the statute 
applies to a defendant who ―is a resident of the property subject 
to foreclosure.‖67  The terms ―is‖ and ―subject to foreclosure‖ 
necessarily pertain to the present tense, when a property is in 
default and when a foreclosure action is pending.  Reference by 
the court in Accredited Home Lenders to the residence language 
of RPAPL 1304 is misplaced, as RPAPL 1304 is only 
incorporated by reference into CPLR 3408 for the limited 
purpose of defining the meaning of ―subprime‖ and 
―nontraditional‖ home loans.68  The language of CPLR 3408 
that entitles the borrower to a settlement conference, where 
―the defendant is a resident of the property subject to 
 
62. Accredited Home Lenders Inc., 866 N.Y.S.2d at 863. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. See, e.g., Jones v. Bill, 890 N.E.2d 884 (N.Y. 2008); Bluebird Partners 
L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, 767 N.E.2d 672, 674 (N.Y. 2002); Yong-Myun Rho v. 
Ambach, 546 N.E.2d 188, 190 (N.Y. 1989); Sutka v. Connors, 538 N.E.2d 
1012, 1015 (N.Y. 1989); Janssen v. Inc. Vill. of Rockville Ctr., 869 N.Y.S.2d 
572, 581-82 (App. Div. 2008); Ragucci v. Prof’l Constr. Servs., 803 N.Y.S.2d 
139, 142 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. Sch. 
Dist., 696 N.E.2d 978, 980 (N.Y. 1998)). 
66. See, e.g., N.Y. STAT. LAW §§ 76, 94; Action Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. 
Goldin, 474 N.E.2d 601, 604 (N.Y. 1984).  See also Ferres v. City of New 
Rochelle, 502 N.E.2d 972, 975 (N.Y. 1986); Uniformed Firefighters Ass’n, 
Local 94 v. Beekman, 420 N.E.2d 938, 941 (N.Y. 1981); Tutunjian v. Conroy, 
865 N.Y.S.2d 768, 770 (App. Div. 2008); Kearns v. Piatt, 716 N.Y.S.2d 418, 
419 (App. Div. 2000). 
67. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(a) (emphasis added). 
68. Id. 
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foreclosure,‖69 is explicit and unambiguous.  The present-tense 
language of the residency requirement of CPLR 3408(a) trumps 
any seemingly inconsistent language in RPAPL 1304, as only 
CPLR 3408 defines the circumstances under which the 
defendant is entitled to the statute’s mandated settlement 
conference.  Consequently, an argument can be made that, 
contrary to the conclusion reached in Accredited Home Lenders, 
the better construction of CPLR 3408 is to apply its residency 
requirement to defendants as of the time the action is 
commenced to foreclose upon the property, remove the 
borrower occupants, and pass title through a court-appointed 
referee. 
In a significant portion of foreclosure actions, the plaintiffs 
eventually file summary judgment motions under CPLR 3212.  
CPLR 3408 contains no language prohibiting the filing and 
service of summary judgment motions prior to the required 
settlement conferences mandated by CPLR 3408.  Presumably, 
if a summary judgment motion is filed before the parties have 
had an opportunity to conduct the settlement conference, the 
court will need to hold the motion in abeyance until the 
conference is completed, since granting any such motion earlier 
would defeat the purpose of the statute.  Some plaintiffs might 
nevertheless file their summary judgment motions early in 
foreclosure litigations, as a means of increasing their leverage 
over defendants during the settlement discussions that will 
occur while the motions are pending.  Other plaintiffs might 
delay summary judgment motions until conferences are held 
and determined to be unsuccessful, which is an approach more 
consistent with the purpose and intent of the statute.70 
 
69. Id. (emphasis added). 
70. On occasion, plaintiffs in foreclosure actions file and serve motions 
for summary judgment in lieu of a complaint under CPLR 3213.  See, e.g., 
Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. v. Thomson, 868 N.Y.S.2d 838 (App. Div. 2008); Lakeville 
Manor, Inc. v. KBK Enters., LLC, 772 N.Y.S.2d 591 (App. Div. 2003); 
Gregorio v. Gregorio, 651 N.Y.S.2d 599 (App. Div. 1996); F.D.I.C. v. De 
Cresenzo, 616 N.Y.S.2d 638 (App. Div. 1994); Norton Co. v. C-TC 9th Ave. 
P’ship, 603 N.Y.S.2d 364 (App. Div. 1993); Joswick v. Rossi, 593 N.Y.S.2d 257 
(App. Div. 1993); Stern v. Chemical Bank, 372 N.Y.S.2d 913, 916 (Civ. Ct. 
1975).  Such motions may only be filed when the action is based upon an 
instrument for the payment of money—like a note—and cannot be used for 
equitable relief such as the court-ordered sale of the property and the eviction 
of the defendant.  In foreclosure actions where the defendant is not subject to 
sale and eviction, the defendant would ordinarily not be a resident of the 
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D. Internal Chronological Limitations 
 
A fourth noteworthy aspect of CPLR 3408(a) is its 
chronological limitations.  CPLR 3408 originally became 
effective as of August 5, 2008.71  It applies only to foreclosure 
actions commenced on or after that date,72 as distinguished 
from actions already pending by that date.73 
The 2008 version of the statute also provides that the 
mandatory settlement conference applies only to foreclosure 
actions involving ―high-cost‖ mortgages executed between 
January 1, 2003 and September 1, 2008.74  These dates 
presumably apply to the time period during which there were 
lax mortgage underwriting standards.  A close reading of the 
original language of CPLR 3408(a) reveals that the time 
limitations are applied to foreclosure actions involving ―high-
cost home loan[s],‖ and that no corresponding time limitation is 
expressly applied to actions involving subprime mortgages or 
nontraditional home loans.75  The time limitations for 
applicable mortgages are set-off in CPLR 3408(a) by commas in 
connection with high-cost home loans, but are not similarly set-
off with respect to either subprime or nontraditional home 
loans.76  This may merely be inartful draftsmanship, or the 
Legislature might have intended that no chronological 
limitation apply to subprime or nontraditional mortgages.  As 
of this writing, no case has yet addressed the applicability of 
CPLR 3408 to subprime or nontraditional home mortgages 
executed outside of the time frame between January 1, 2003 
and September 1, 2008. 
 
property.  Accordingly, it would appear that in actions where plaintiffs seek 
summary judgment in lieu of a complaint under CPLR 3213, the absence of 
the defendant’s residence in the property would render the settlement 
conference of CPLR 3408 inapplicable. 
71. 2008 N.Y. Laws ch. 472, § 3. 
72. See Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., 
Book 7B, CPLR C3408.  See also LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Novetti, 889 
N.Y.S.2d 506, No. 6535-08, 2009 WL 1810511, at *2 (Sup. Ct. June 15, 2009) 
(unreported disposition). 
73. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2009 WL 1810511, at *2. 
74. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(a). 
75. Id. 3408. 
76. Id. 
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E. The Statute’s Non-Retroactivity 
 
Statutes in New York are generally presumed to have 
prospective application, unless their language expressly or 
impliedly requires a retroactive construction.77  CPLR 3408 
contains no language indicating that it may be applied to 
actions pending prior to its effective date.78 
One case confirms the absence of retroactivity, LaSalle 
Bank National Ass’n v. Novetti.79  LaSalle Bank involved a 
foreclosure action commenced on February 13, 2008, prior to 
the effective date of CPLR 3408.80  The defendant initially 
defaulted in appearing and answering the plaintiff’s 
complaint.81  An order of reference was rendered on September 
16, 2008, after the effective date of CPLR 3408, and was 
followed by a judgment of foreclosure and sale executed by the 
court on January 26, 2009.82  Thereafter, on February 5, 2009, 
counsel for the defendant, who had belatedly appeared in the 
action, demanded a settlement conference and moved to stay 
the foreclosure sale pending the conduct of the conference.83  
The Supreme Court, Suffolk County, denied the defendant the 
settlement conference contemplated by CPLR 3408 on the 
ground that the foreclosure action had been commenced prior 
to the effective date of the statute.84  The court’s ruling appears 
to be correct.  If CPLR 3408 is viewed as a remedial statute, 
 
77. See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 51(b), (c).  E.g., Duell ex rel. Estate of Duell v. 
Condon, 647 N.E.2d 96, 100 (N.Y. 1995); Dorfman v. Leidner, 565 N.E.2d 472, 
474 (N.Y. 1990); Thomas v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 470 N.E.2d 831, 833 (N.Y. 
1984); Beary v. City of Rye, 377 N.E.2d 453, 459 (N.Y. 1978); Deutsch v. 
Catherwood, 294 N.E.2d 193, 194 (N.Y. 1973); County of Herkimer v. Daines, 
876 N.Y.S.2d 303 (App. Div. 2009), leave to appeal denied, 876 N.Y.S.2d 804 
(App. Div. 2009); State ex rel. Spitzer v. Daicel Chem. Indus., 840 N.Y.S.2d 8, 
10-11 (App. Div. 2007); Chapman v. State, 690 N.Y.S.2d 328 (App. Div. 1999); 
Wade v. Byung Yang Kim, 681 N.Y.S.2d 355, 356-57 (App. Div. 1998); Auger 
v. State, 666 N.Y.S.2d 760, 762 (App. Div. 1997), after remand 693 N.Y.S.2d 
343 (App. Div. 1999); Morales v. Gross, 657 N.Y.S.2d (App. Div. 1997). 
78. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408. 
79. 889 N.Y.S.2d 506, No. 6535-08, 2009 WL 1810511, at *1 (Sup. Ct. 
June 15, 2009) (unreported disposition). 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at *1-2. 
82. Id. at *2. 
83. Id.  
84. Id.  
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intended to stem the rash of home foreclosures within the state 
by providing defendant homeowners with a new right to a 
settlement conference, then the statute—as with all statutes 
that create new rights—is to be applied prospectively.85  If 
CPLR 3408 is instead viewed as merely procedural in nature, 
then it is to be applied in pending actions only as to procedural 
steps to be undertaken after the statute’s enactment.86  In 
LaSalle Bank, the 60-day settlement conference period had 
presumably already passed by the time CPLR 3408 became 
effective. 
Separate from CPLR 3408, the state also enacted, at the 
same time, an Unconsolidated Law that provides certain 
retroactive relief to defendant homeowners.  Section 3-a of the 
enacted bill87 provides that, for residential foreclosure actions 
commenced before September 1, 2008, courts must ask the 
plaintiff whether the loan at issue falls within the scope of the 
new statute, and, if it does, the court must then notify the 
defendant of the right to demand a settlement conference.88  
Curiously, the language of Section 3-a expressly applies to 
subprime and high-cost home loans as defined by RPAPL 1304 
and Banking Law 6-l, but does not expressly apply to 
nontraditional home loans, unlike CPLR 3408.89  A settlement 
conference under Section 3-a is not a mandated right.  Section 
3-a further provides that, to be eligible for a settlement 
conference, the defendant must reside at the property subject 
to foreclosure and the action must not yet have proceeded to 
judgment.90 
 
85. See, e.g., Simonson v. Int’l Bank, 200 N.E.2d 427, 431-32 (N.Y. 1964); 
Jacobus v. Colgate, 111 N.E. 837, 838-39 (N.Y. 1916); State ex rel. Spitzer v. 
Daicel Chem. Indus., 840 N.Y.S.2d 8, 11 (App. Div. 2007); Mealing v. Hills, 
517 N.Y.S.2d 321, 322 (App. Div. 1987); Cady v. County of Broome, 451 
N.Y.S.2d 206 (App. Div. 1982); Linda I.V. v. Gil R.C., 673 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Fam. 
Ct. 1998); Ponterio v. Regan, 521 N.Y.S.2d 965, 966-67 (Sup. Ct. 1987). 
86. See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 55 (McKinney 2009); Simonson v. Int’l Bank, 
200 N.E.2d 427, 431-32 (N.Y. 1964); Chapman v. State, 690 N.Y.S.2d 328, 
328 (App. Div. 1999); Wade v. Byung Yang Kim, 681 N.Y.S.2d 355, 357 (App. 
Div. 1998); Auger v. State, 666 N.Y.S.2d 760 (App. Div. 1997). 
87. 2008 N.Y. Laws ch. 472, § 3-a. 
88. Id.; LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Novetti, 889 N.Y.S.2d 506, No. 6535-
08, 2009 WL 1810511, at *1 (Sup. Ct. June 15, 2009) (unreported disposition); 
Siegel, supra note 13. 
89. 2008 N.Y. Laws ch. 472, § 3-a. 
90. Id.  See also LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2009 WL 1810511, at *1. 
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F. Telephonic and Video-Conferencing 
 
The last sentence of CPLR 3408 refers to a telephonic and 
video-conference option.91  Participation in a foreclosure 
settlement conference by electronic means is a matter left to 
the discretion of the court.92  Video-conferencing, whatever its 
merits given current technology, is not a concept that is 
otherwise recognized in either the CPLR or in the Uniform 
Rules for the New York State Trial Courts.93  Notably, the 
option under CPLR 3408 is expressly limited to ―a 
representative of the plaintiff to attend the settlement 
conference telephonically or by video-conference.‖94  The 
electronic option is not extended, by the wording of the statute, 
to defendants or their attorneys. 
The statute’s provision that a ―representative of the 
plaintiff‖ may be permitted to electronically participate in the 
conference does not appear to refer to the plaintiff’s attorney.  
CPLR 3408 refers frequently to ―the plaintiff,‖ ―the defendant,‖ 
―parties,‖ and ―counsel.‖  The term ―representative of the 
 
91. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(c). 
92. Specifically, CPLR 3408(c) provides that ―[w]here appropriate, the 
court may‖ allow telephonic or video participation, which is language of 
discretion.  Id. (emphasis added).  See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 177(a) cmt. 
93. At most, section 202.15 of the Uniform Rules for the New York State 
Trial Courts provides for audio-visual recording of witness depositions, 
pursuant to specific procedures set forth in the rule.  N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & 
REGS. tit. 22, § 202.15 (2010).  See also Duncan v. 605 3rd Ave., LLC, 853 
N.Y.S.2d 592 (App. Div. 2008); R.M. v. Dr. R., 59 N.Y.S.2d 906, No. 50364(U), 
2008 WL 509092 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 26, 2008) (unreported disposition); In re 
Sawyer, 823 N.Y.S.2d 641, 645 (Sup. Ct. 2006); Parker v. Parker, 773 
N.Y.S.2d 518, 523 (Sup. Ct. 2003); Fajardo v. St. Joseph’s Med. Ctr., 746 
N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 (Sup. Ct. 2002); Roche v. Udell, 588 N.Y.S.2d 76, 79-81 
(Sup. Ct. 1992); Velasquez v. Columbia Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 522 N.Y.S.2d 
416, 418 (Sup. Ct. 1987).  Nevertheless, video-conference technology has also 
been utilized for witnesses at certain hearings and trials.  See, e.g., Dates v. 
Mundt, 771 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App. Div. 2004); Perez v. Hynes, 880 N.Y.S.2d 875, 
No. 50196(U), 2009 WL 305520 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 04, 2009) (unreported 
disposition); State v. Pedraza, 853 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 (Sup. Ct. 2007); People 
v. Chase, 803 N.Y.S.2d 20, No. 51125(U), 2005 WL 1692330 (N.Y. County Ct. 
May 19, 2005) (unreported disposition), but in criminal trials the concept 
appears to conflict with the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment.  See United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 
1314 (11th Cir. 2006); People v. Wrotten, 871 N.Y.S.2d 28, 37 (App. Div. 
2008). 
94. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(c) (emphasis added). 
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plaintiff‖ appears only one time in the statute, when referring 
to the electronic participation option.  The Legislature’s use of 
the term ―representative‖ rather than ―counsel‖ suggests that 
the individual who may participate in the conference 
electronically is someone other than the plaintiff’s attorney; 
otherwise, the Legislature could have simply referred to the 
individual as the plaintiff’s counsel, as it did elsewhere.  The 
Bill Jacket for CPLR 3408 sheds no particular light on the 
identity of this ―representative.‖  However, the term likely 
refers to a representative of the bank or mortgage company, 
such as a corporate officer, litigation manager, or accountant 
involved in settlement-related decision-making or the 
computation of proposed compromised payment schedules. 
It remains to be seen how frequently the statute’s 
electronic participation option will be used.  On the one hand, 
loan specialists’ participation in settlement conferences from 
remote locations may recognize a manpower reality: that the 
volume of mortgage foreclosure conferences necessitates this 
accommodation to party plaintiffs.  On the other hand, courts 
might find that settlements are less likely to be achieved 
absent the face-to-face participation of all individuals necessary 
to the successful resolution of a foreclosure action. 
 
II. The Expansion of CPLR 3408 Effective December 15, 2009 
 
The ink was dry on the original version of CPLR 3408 for 
less than a year before bills were introduced in the New York 
State Legislature to expand its scope.  The bills that emerged 
from the State’s Senate and Assembly, S66007 and A40007, 
mandated the conduct of settlement conferences in all 
residential mortgage foreclosure actions, not just those 
involving subprime, non-traditional, or high-cost mortgages.95  
The expanded legislation was signed into law by Governor 
David Paterson on December 15, 2009.96 
 
95. New York State Senate, S66007: Relates to home mortgage loans, 
the crime of mortgage fraud, and appropriations to the NYS housing trust 
fund corporation, http://open.nysenate.gov/openleg/api/1.0/html/bill/S66007 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2010); New York State Assembly, Summary – A40007, 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A40007 (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
96. 2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 507, § 9 (McKinney); Press Release, 
Governor David A. Paterson, Governor Paterson Signs Comprehensive 
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The amendment of CPLR 3408 adds, inter alia, 
subdivisions (d) through (h) to the statute.97  The amended 
statute keeps intact all aspects of the original version of the 
statute, except for the application of its terms in subdivision (a) 
to all ―home loans.‖98  The meaning of ―home loans‖ is set forth 
in RPAPL 1304, and includes all loans for one- to four-family 
dwellings secured by a mortgage or deed of trust.  The 
amended statute therefore abolishes the need for qualifying 
residential mortgage foreclosure defendants to be parties to 
subprime, non-traditional or high-cost loans.  Inferentially, the 
expanded statute recognizes a current economic reality that the 
foreclosure problem in New York extends beyond subprime, 
non-traditional and high-cost residential mortgages, to 
conventional residential mortgages as well. 
Predictably, the 2009 amendments to CPLR 3408 will 
place an immediate added burden on the court system, which 
shall now be required to conduct a significantly increased 
number of foreclosure settlement conferences without any 
earmarked funding to meet the need.99  The New York State 
Office of Court Administration estimates that the new 
statewide foreclosure filings for 2009 will approximate 
46,000,100 which suggests the magnitude of the challenge facing 
the conferencing courts in 2010 and beyond. 
The expansion of CPLR 3408 to all residential home loans 
is subject to an intriguing ―sunset‖ provision.  It provides that 
the expansion of the statute to all ―home loans‖ be effective for 
only five years from the effective date of the 2009 version of 
CPLR 3408(a), at which time the statute reverts to its original 
2008 form that limits the mandatory foreclosure settlement 
conferences to subprime, non-traditional, and high-cost 
residential mortgages.101  Inferentially, the presence of a sunset 
provision suggests legislative optimism that the current 
residential mortgage foreclosure difficulties will lessen with 
 
Foreclosure Legislation into Law (Dec. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.state.ny.us/governor/press/press_12150901.html. 
97. 2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 507, § 9(d) – (h) (McKinney). 
98. Id. § 9(a). 
99. Vesselin Mitey, Strained Courts Brace for Influx of Foreclosure 
Conferences Under Law That Broadens Eligibility, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 18, 2009, 
at 1. 
100. Id. 
101. 2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 507, § 25(e) (McKinney). 
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time. 
CPLR 3408(f), as now enacted, requires that plaintiffs and 
defendants negotiate with each other in good faith during their 
mandated settlement conferences.102  The statutory purpose of 
the settlement conferences will not be achieved absent the good 
faith of the parties involved.  CPLR 3408(f) does not set forth 
any specific remedy for a party’s failure to negotiate in good 
faith.  However, in one reported decision dealing with this 
subject prior to the effective date of the amended statute, a 
court held that the failure of the plaintiff bank to negotiate in 
good faith during the mandated conference warranted, as a 
remedy under the circumstances of that action, the cancellation 
of the mortgage altogether.103  The court cancelled the 
mortgage by asserting equitable powers, in response to the 
plaintiff bank’s ―inequitable, unconscionable, vexatious and 
opprobrious‖ behavior.104  Professor Siegel hints that the 
drastic remedy that was imposed may reach an appellate court 
for review.105 
CPLR 3408(g), as now enacted, requires plaintiffs in 
residential foreclosure actions to file notices of discontinuances 
and to vacate lis pendens within 150 days from the execution of 
any settlement agreement or loan modification.106 
CPLR 3408(h), as now enacted, prohibits any party to a 
foreclosure action from charging the other party legal fees 
incurred in connection with the settlement conference itself.107  
This amendment appears to be directed at provisions of 
mortgages that impose legal fees upon mortgagors for various 
costs associated with defaults and the enforcement of 
mortgagees’ rights. 
 
 
102. Id. § 9(f). 
103. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, 890 N.Y.S.2d 313, 319-20 
(Sup. Ct. 2009). 
104. Id. at 319. 
105. David D. Siegel, Invoking Equitable Powers, Court Cancels 
Mortgage and Note of Foreclosing Plaintiff for “Duplicity” and “Opprobrious 
Demeanor” in Failing to Cooperate at Conference, SIEGEL’S PRAC. REV., Dec. 
2009, at 1, available at 216 SIEGELPR 1 (WestLaw). 
106. 2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 507, § 9(g) (McKinney). 
107. Id. § 9(h). 
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III. Perceived Pitfalls of CPLR 3408 
 
While CPLR 3408 is a welcome addition to the family of 
New York’s procedural statutes, one that performs a 
worthwhile social purpose, the statute’s construction and 
wording raises certain discrete shortcomings.  These 
shortcomings involve inconsistencies regarding how the sixty-
day conference requirement is to be measured, the effect of 
proofs of service filed in connection with default motions, and 
the absence of mechanisms that might render the settlement 
conferences more productive. 
 
A. Measurement of the Sixty-Day Conference Requirement 
 
CPLR 3408(a) provides a time frame within which the 
settlement conference mandated by the statute is to be held.  It 
provides that the conference be conducted ―within sixty days 
after the date when proof of service is filed with the county 
clerk, or on such adjourned date as has been agreed to by the 
parties . . .‖108  The statute’s measurement of the conference 
period—from the filing of proof of service with the clerk of the 
court—is an oddity, and it is unwise because, while certain 
methods of service of process in New York require the filing of 
proof of service, other methods do not. 
More specifically, CPLR 308(2) permits service of process 
to be accomplished at a defendant’s ―actual place of business, 
dwelling place, or usual place of abode‖ by delivery of the 
summons to a person of suitable age and discretion, followed 
within twenty days by either a mailing to the defendant at his 
or her last known residence, or a first-class mailing to the 
defendant at his or her actual place of business in an 
unmarked envelope marked ―personal and confidential.‖109  
 
108. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(a) (McKinney 2009).  
109. Id. 308(2).  See generally, Charnin v. Cogan, 673 N.Y.S.2d 134, 135-
36 (App. Div. 1998); Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Venticinque, 658 
N.Y.S.2d 689 (App. Div. 1997); Melton v. Brotman Foot Care Group, 604 
N.Y.S.2d 203 (App. Div. 1993); Donohue v. Schwartz, 570 N.Y.S.2d 542 (App. 
Div. 1991); Borges v. Entra Am., Inc., 801 N.Y.S.2d 230, No. 50845(U), 2005 
WL 1355144, at *2 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. May 9, 2005) (unreported disposition); 
Star Brite Painting, Inc. v. Dubie’s Hot Spot Inc., 784 N.Y.S.2d 924, No. 
50136(U), 2004 WL 503488, at *2 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. Mar. 1, 2004) 
(unreported disposition). 
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When the ―suitable age and discretion‖ method is used, the 
plaintiff is required to file proof of service with the clerk of the 
court within twenty days from the latter of such delivery or 
mailing, and service is deemed to be complete ten days after 
the filing.110 
Likewise, if service cannot be accomplished with due 
diligence by either personal service or upon a person of suitable 
age and discretion, the plaintiff may utilize the colloquially-
known ―nail and mail‖ method set forth in CPLR 308(4), which 
also has a proof of service requirement.111  This method 
requires that the summons be affixed to the door of the 
defendant’s actual place of business, dwelling place, or usual 
place of abode, followed by a mailing to the defendant at his or 
her last known residence, or by a first-class mailing to the 
defendant’s actual place of business in an unmarked envelope 
marked ―personal and confidential.‖112  Like service under 
CPLR 308(2), the ―nail and mail‖ method requires the filing of 
proof of service with the clerk of the court within twenty days 
of either the affixing or mailing, whichever is later, and service 
is deemed complete ten days after such filing.113 
However, many actions are commenced in New York by 
 
110. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(2).  See generally Weininger v. Sassower, 612 
N.Y.S.2d 249 (App. Div. 1994); Bartlett v. Gage, 633 N.Y.S.2d 246, 248 (Sup. 
Ct. 1995).  The failure of a party to file a timely proof of claim is not a 
jurisdictional defect, but is instead a mere irregularity that is curable by 
motion to the court.  See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2004; Zareef v. Lin Wong, 877 
N.Y.S.2d 182 (App. Div. 2009); County of Nassau v. Gallagher, 828 N.Y.S.2d 
445 (App. Div. 2006); Penachio v. Penachio, 812 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594 (App. Div. 
2006); Koslowski v. Koslowski, 672 N.Y.S.2d 808 (App. Div. 1998); 
Hausknecht v. Ackerman, 662 N.Y.S.2d 567, 569-70 (App. Div. 1997); Bank of 
N.Y. v. Schwab, 467 N.Y.S.2d 415 (App. Div. 1983); Marazita v. Nelbach, 456 
N.Y.S.2d 423 (App. Div. 1982). 
111. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(4). 
112. Id.  See generally Feinstein v. Bergner, 48 N.Y.2d 234, 239 (1979); 
Comm’rs of State Ins. Fund v. Khondoker, 865 N.Y.S.2d 287, 288 (App. Div. 
2008); Gantman v. Cohen, 618 N.Y.S.2d 100, 100-01 (App. Div. 1994); 
Schwartzman v. Musso, 607 N.Y.S.2d 953 (App. Div. 1994); Woods v. Balick, 
603 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1993); Serrano v. Pape, 591 N.Y.S.2d 516 (App. 
Div. 1992); Magalios v. Benjamin, 554 N.Y.S.2d 61, 61 (App. Div. 1990); 
Tymkin v. Edwards, 551 N.Y.S.2d 126 (App. Div. 1990); Citibank, N.A. v. 
Keller, 518 N.Y.S.2d 409, 410 (App. Div. 1987); Ladell v. Field, 495 N.Y.S.2d 
449, 450 (App. Div. 1985); Agin v. Krest Assocs., 599 N.Y.S.2d 367, 369 n.2 
(Sup. Ct. 1992). 
113. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(4).  See generally Rosato v. Ricciardi, 571 
N.Y.S.2d 633 (App. Div. 1991). 
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means of personal service upon individual defendants as 
authorized by CPLR 308(1)114 and by service upon a properly-
designated agent as authorized by CPLR 308(3).115  Neither of 
these methods require, in CPLR 308 or elsewhere, that the 
plaintiff file any proof of service with the court.116 
Accordingly, in residential foreclosure actions where 
process is served upon the defendant and where proof of service 
need not be filed with the clerk of the court, CPLR 3408 
contains no statutory trigger date for the scheduling of the 
mandatory settlement conference.  Conceivably, in the absence 
of a statutory trigger mechanism, the settlement conference 
need not necessarily be scheduled at all.  This flaw in 
legislative draftsmanship was probably not intended by the 
New York Legislature, as it potentially thwarts the purpose 
and intent of CPLR 3408 in instances where defendants in 
residential foreclosure actions are served personally or through 
a designated agent. 
This flawed draftsmanship could have been avoided.  In 
matrimonial actions, Uniform Rule 202.16(f) provides for an 
analogous requirement that a preliminary conference be held 
between the parties and the court ―within 45 days after the 
action has been assigned.‖117  The assignment of an action to a 
judge, by means of a Request for Judicial Intervention (―RJI‖), 
must occur in matrimonial actions within forty-five days from 
 
114. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(1).  See generally Espy v. Giorlando, 436 N.E.2d 
193 (N.Y. 1982); McGreevy v. Simon, 633 N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (App. Div. 1995); 
Coyne v. Besser, 546 N.Y.S.2d 129 (App. Div. 1989); Velez v. Smith, 540 
N.Y.S.2d 339 (App. Div. 1989); Jones v. Nossoughi, 537 N.Y.S.2d 565 (App. 
Div. 1989); Prof’l Billing Res., Inc. v. Haddad, 705 N.Y.S.2d 204, 207 (N.Y. 
City Civ. Ct. 2000); Bertha G. v. Paul T., 509 N.Y.S.2d 995, 996-97 (Fam. Ct. 
1986). 
115. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(3).  See generally Jackson v. County of Nassau, 
339 F. Supp. 2d 473, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Espy, 436 N.E.2d at 193; 
Donaldson v. Melville, 507 N.Y.S.2d 301, 302 (App. Div. 1986); Hall v. 
Bickweat, 584 N.Y.S.2d 690 (App. Div. 1992); In re Estate of Gottesman, 511 
N.Y.S.2d 643, 644, (App. Div. 1989). 
116. Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(1) & (3) with N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(2) & (4). 
117. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.16(f) (2004).  Uniform 
Rule 202.12(b), which applies to other civil actions, has a similar forty-five 
day requirement for the scheduling of preliminary conferences measured 
from the purchase and filing of a Request for Judicial Intervention (―RJI‖).  
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.12(b) (2009).  In non-matrimonial 
actions, however, there is no deadline for the filing of an RJI.  N.Y. COMP. 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.6(a) (2000). 
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the date of service upon the defendant of the summons with 
notice or summons and complaint.118  The mandatory 
preliminary conference for matrimonial actions under Uniform 
Rule 202.16(f), therefore, in effect, establishes an outside date 
within which preliminary conferences must be conducted by 
the court.  The purpose of Uniform Rule 202.16(f) is to assure 
that matrimonial actions, which often raise difficult and 
important issues such as child custody, visitation, pendente lite 
child support and maintenance, and the ultimate equitable 
distribution of marital assets, receive reasonably prompt 
attention from the courts.119  Prompt preliminary conferences 
ensure that parties have an opportunity, early in their 
litigations, to stipulate to non-contested issues and to obtain 
court-ordered discovery schedules that shepherd the progress 
of the litigations.  The scheduling of preliminary conferences in 
matrimonial actions, triggered by the filing of a deadlined RJI, 
is implemented in courts throughout the state without 
apparent problems or difficulties.  Similarly, in actions for 
medical, dental and podiatric malpractice, CPLR 3406(a) 
requires the filing of a notice with the court within sixty days 
from the joinder of issue.120  The purpose of the notice is to 
trigger an early conference with the court to discuss 
settlement, simplify issues, and schedule discovery.121  There is 
no reason that the New York Legislature, in enacting CPLR 
3408, could not also have required that settlement conferences 
be scheduled within a certain time period after a fixed date 
applicable to all foreclosure actions, such as from the filing of 
the plaintiff’s summons and complaint or the joinder of issue.  
 
118. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.16(d) (2004).  The RJI 
must be purchased for a fee of $95.00.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8020(a).  CPLR 306-b 
requires that absent a court-approved extension, process must be made upon 
the defendant within 120 days from the filing of the plaintiff’s summons with 
notice or summons and complaint.  Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 
N.Y.2d 95, 100-01 (2001).  If a matrimonial plaintiff takes the full 120 days 
for service, followed by the full forty-five days for purchasing an RJI, and if 
the court conducts a preliminary conference forty-five days thereafter, the 
time frame for conducting the initial matrimonial conference is capped at 210 
days from the action’s commencement.  As a practical matter, preliminary 
conferences in matrimonial actions are conducted well in advance of the 
mathematical calendar maximum. 
119. Cf. Qi v. Ng, 632 N.Y.S.2d 757, 757 (Sup. Ct. 1995). 
120. See also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.56(a)(1), (b); 
Sturleti v. Stigliano, 511 N.Y.S.2d 770, 770 (Sup. Ct. 1986). 
121. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3406(a). 
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Instead, by measuring the scheduling period from the filing of 
proof of service, which may not even occur in certain cases, 
CPLR 3408 introduces an element of statutory uncertainty and 
potential confusion that could have been easily avoided. 
This defect in legislative draftsmanship is partially 
mitigated by the Chief Administrative Judge’s promulgation of 
Uniform Rule 202.12a122 for residential mortgage foreclosure 
actions commenced on or after September 1, 2008.123  Uniform 
Rule 202.12a applies to subprime, non-traditional, and high-
cost home loans, as defined by RPAPL 1304 and Banking Law 
6-l, entered into between January 1, 2003 and September 1, 
2008.  Thus, the rule is similar in scope to the Subprime 
Residential Loan and Foreclosure Laws of 2008 including, 
specifically, CPLR 3408.124  Uniform Rule 202.12a requires that 
foreclosure plaintiffs covered by the rule file a specialized RJI 
―[a]t the time that proof of service of the summons and 
complaint is filed with the county clerk.‖125  Uniform Rule 
202.12a implements the procedure by which the mandatory 
settlement conferences are then scheduled, noticed, and 
conducted, in a manner consistent with and in furtherance of 
CPLR 3408.126 
The one problem with Uniform Rule 202.12a, however, is 
that the specialized foreclosure RJI need not be filed by the 
plaintiff until the filing of the plaintiff’s proof of service and, as 
noted, the filing of proof of service is not always required.127  
The reason that Uniform Rule 202.12a mitigates the problem is 
that plaintiffs cannot seek or obtain relief from the courts, such 
as by the filing of motions for summary judgment, except by 
first filing their RJIs.  In the end, therefore, the Uniform Rule 
will accomplish its practical purpose of triggering the 
mandated settlement conference in all covered actions, either 
sooner or later in each covered action.  Uniform Rule 202.12a is 
 
122. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.12a (2008). 
123. Id. § 202.12a(a). 
124. The one noticeable difference between CPLR 3408 and Uniform 
Rule 202.12a is that the statute applies to covered actions commenced as of 
its effective date, August 5, 2008, whereas the Uniform Rule applies to 
covered actions commenced as of September 1, 2008.  The chronological 
difference is marginal. 
125. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.12a(b). 
126. Compare id. § 202.12a(c) with N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408. 
127. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(1), (3). 
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not as effective as its matrimonial counterpart, Uniform Rule 
202.16(d), as the mortgage foreclosure rule places no fixed 
outside time limit on when the plaintiff’s RJI must be filed in 
all cases, whereas the matrimonial rule requires the filing of 
an RJI within forty-five days from the service of the summons 
upon the defendant in every case.128  In other words, Uniform 
Rule 202.16(d) will prove to be more effective in assuring the 
scheduling of prompt preliminary conferences for all 
matrimonial litigants than Uniform Rule 202.12a will be in 
assuring prompt settlement conferences for covered residential 
foreclosure litigants.  The delay in scheduling and conducting 
settlement conferences in certain covered foreclosure actions 
will occur in circumstances when plaintiffs are under no 
statutory obligation to file proofs of service under CPLR 308(1) 
and 308(3), and where no RJIs are filed until such times that 
plaintiffs are motivated to seek some form of affirmative relief 
from the courts. 
Plaintiffs who might wish to avoid participation in 
conferences, calculating that their financial interests are 
furthered by foreclosures rather than settlements, can take no 
solace from the draftsmanship of CPLR 3408 or Uniform Rule 
202.12a.  At first blush, the wording of CPLR 3408 and 
Uniform Rule 202.12-a might provide such foreclosure 
plaintiffs with an incentive to serve process upon residential 
defendants only by methods that do not require the filing of 
proofs of service with the court, as a calculated means of 
circumventing the trigger event of the settlement conferences 
altogether.  However, if such plaintiffs desire judgments of 
foreclosure and auctions of the foreclosed properties, as they 
ultimately do in commencing their actions, they must all 
eventually file RJIs.  In turn, these filings will trigger the very 
mandated settlement conferences that the plaintiffs were 
trying to avoid. 
Judges can further the letter and spirit of CPLR 3408 by 
assuring that if the RJI is filed by plaintiffs in conjunction with 
motions for affirmative relief, such as for summary judgment, 
the motions should be held in abeyance pending the completion 
of the mandated settlement conference.  Such a rule would be 
 
128. Compare N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.12a(c) with 
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.16(d). 
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consistent with the discretion that is afforded to trial judges to 
control their calendars.129  Courts should not permit foreclosure 
plaintiffs to use summary judgment motions to circumvent the 
settlement conference procedures of CPLR 3408. 
 
B. Whether Proof of Service Filed in Support of a Default 
Motion Triggers A Mandatory Settlement Conference Under 
the Statute 
 
As noted, when service of process is accomplished by either 
personal service or upon a designated agent, the CPLR does not 
impose upon plaintiffs any obligation to file proof of service 
with the clerks of the courts.130  As also noted, the procedures 
of CPLR 3408 are written so that the statute’s mandatory 
settlement conference is not triggered until the filing of proofs 
of service,131 though courts have authority to schedule such 
conferences in any event. 
If proof of service need not be filed with the clerk of the 
court, and if a defendant defaults by failing to appear in the 
action or answer the plaintiff’s complaint, the remedy that is 
routinely undertaken by foreclosure plaintiffs is to file a motion 
seeking judgment on default.132  One of the elements that must 
be proven in support of default judgments is proof of service of 
process upon the defendant.133  Indeed, CPLR 3215(f) requires 
that all motions for default judgments contain evidence134 
proving that service of process has, in fact, been effected upon 
the defendant.135  An issue that arises from such default 
 
129. See, e.g., Schreiber-Cross v. State, 870 N.Y.S.2d 438, 442 (App. Div. 
2008). 
130. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(1), (3). 
131. Id. 3408(a). 
132. See id. 3215(a). 
133. See, e.g., Oparaji v. Duran, 795 N.Y.S.2d 341 (App. Div. 2005).  
Accord N.Y. Mut. Underwriters v. Baumgartner, 797 N.Y.S.2d 210, 214 (App. 
Div. 2005); Ocuto Blacktop & Paving Co. v. Trataros Constr., 715 N.Y.S.2d 
565 (App. Div. 2000); Green v. Dolphy Constr. Co., 590 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239 
(App. Div. 1992).  
134. The evidence typically contained in the moving papers is an 
affidavit of service.  Conceivably, it could also include a written 
acknowledgment of service by the person served. 
135. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3215(f).  See generally Mullins v. DiLorenzo, 606 
N.Y.S.2d 161 (App. Div. 1993); Shapiro v. Rose, 600 N.Y.S.2d 819 (App. Div. 
1993); Ice Sculpture Designs, Inc. v. Icebreakers, 836 N.Y.S.2d 493, No. 
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motions, unique to foreclosure actions subject to CPLR 3408, is 
whether the inclusion of proof of service in the supporting 
papers constitutes a ―filing of proof of service‖ with the clerk so 
as to trigger, under these circumstances, the mandatory 
settlement conference. 
As of this writing, no reported decision has been rendered 
by any court that addresses this issue.  There does not appear 
to be any persuasive reason on the face of the statute why proof 
of service contained in a default motion would not qualify as a 
filing of proof of service for purposes of CPLR 3408.  While it is 
true that a defendant who is truly in default might not appear 
at any settlement conference that the court would schedule, 
CPLR 3408 is not designed to compel such an appearance; 
rather, it merely requires that these conferences be scheduled 
so that defendants have the opportunity to appear and 
participate in them.  Apropos to the statute is the maxim that 
―you can lead a horse to water but you can’t make him drink.‖  
The court’s obligation under CPLR 3408(a) is to schedule the 
contemplated settlement conference, and to conduct the 
conference when the parties appear for it.  Doing so fulfills the 
court’s statutory obligations whether the defendant appears or 
defaults. 
If, arguendo, evidence of proof of service attached to a 
default motion doubles as a ―filing‖ of proof of service with the 
clerk of the court so as to mandate the scheduling of a 
settlement conference, then, necessarily, courts should hold 
such default motions in abeyance pending the scheduling of a 
conference at which the defendant may, or may not, appear.  
CPLR 3408 sets forth no minimum notice period; it only 
imposes a sixty-day maximum deadline measured from the 
filing of proof of service.  Notice of a scheduled settlement 
conference while a default motion is held in abeyance, as with 
notice of all conferences generally, should be reasonable and 
transmitted by the court to an address calculated to advise the 
 
50194(U), 2007 WL340293, at *2 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 5, 2007) (unreported 
disposition); Tucker Family Trust v. Taylor, 836 N.Y.S.2d 490, No. 50087(U), 
2007 WL 137112 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 2007) (unreported disposition); Einheber 
v. Bodenheimer, 820 N.Y.S.2d 842, No. 51264(U), 2006 WL 1835019, at *3 
(Sup. Ct. May, 5, 2006) (unreported disposition); Adkins v. Lipner, Gordon & 
Co., 814 N.Y.S.2d 559, No. 52073(U), 2005 WL 3487789, at *3 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 
20, 2005) (unreported disposition); Jann v. Cassidy, 696 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. 
Ct. 1999); Matthew v. Mosier, 832 N.Y.S.2d 408 (City Ct. 2007). 
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defendant of the date, time, and place of the conference.  Any 
delays occasioned by the conference procedure to the prompt 
disposition of pending default motions would be expected in 
most instances to be reasonable and minor and would be 
outweighed by the intended benefit to the parties of potentially 
settling foreclosure actions in a restructured manner that may 
keep families in their homes. 
 
C. Does the Absence of a Conference Warrant the Vacatur of a 
Default Judgment? 
 
Conceivably, a court could, through ministerial error, fail 
to schedule a settlement conference as mandated by CPLR 
3408.  In such a scenario, if a borrower does not appear and 
answer in a foreclosure action and a judgment of foreclosure is 
rendered on default, may the borrower obtain a vacatur of the 
judgment on the ground that the settlement conference 
opportunity was not provided?  The short answer is no. 
In New York, defendants who seek to vacate default 
judgments are generally required under CPLR 5015 to meet a 
two-pronged test, the first being a reasonable excuse for the 
default,136 and the second being the existence of a meritorious 
claim or defense.137 
 
136. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5015(a)(1).  E.g., Jones v. 414 Equities LLC, 866 
N.Y.S.2d 165, 178 (App. Div. 2008); Apple Bank for Sav. v. Fort Tyron 
Apartments Corp., 843 N.Y.S.2d 307 (App. Div. 2007); State v. Williams, 843 
N.Y.S.2d 722, 724 (App. Div. 2007); Knupfer v. Hertz Corp., 827 N.Y.S.2d 
394,394 (App. Div. 2006); Nilt, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 826 
N.Y.S.2d 471 (App. Div 2006); Wilson v. Sherman Terrace Co-op, Inc., 787 
N.Y.S.2d 318 (App. Div. 2005); Heskel’s West 38th St. Corp. v. Gotham 
Constr. Co., 787 N.Y.S.2d 285 (App. Div. 2005); Smolinski v. Smolinski, 786 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (App. Div. 2004); Taylor v. Saal, 771 N.Y.S.2d 671 (App. Div. 
2004); Dominguez v. Carioscia, 766 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (App. Div. 2003); 
Sanford v. 27-29 W. 181st St. Ass’n, 753 N.Y.S.2d 49 (App. Div. 2002). 
137. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5015(a)(2).  See, e.g.,  Maines Paper & Food Serv., Inc. 
v. Boulevard Burgers Corp., 861 N.Y.S.2d 808, 810 (App. Div. 2008); Fladell 
v. Am. Red Magen David for Israel, 844 N.Y.S.2d 136 (App. Div. 2007); 
Vargas v. Ahmed, 837 N.Y.S.2d 654 (App. Div. 2007); ORT Assocs. v. 
Mouzouris, 836 N.Y.S.2d 62 (App. Div. 2007); Bollino v. Hitzig, 825 N.Y.S.2d 
511 (App. Div. 2006); Rubenbauer v. Mekelburg, 803 N.Y.S.2d 183 (App. Div. 
2005); Alaska Seaboard Partners v. Grant, 799 N.Y.S.2d 117 (App. Div. 
2005); Compass Group, USA, Inc. v. Mazula, 795 N.Y.S.2d 395 (App. Div. 
2005); Dodge v. Commander, 794 N.Y.S.2d 482 (App. Div. 2005); Wilson v. 
Sherman Terrace Co-op, Inc., 787 N.Y.S.2d 318 (App. Div. 2005); Merrill/N.Y. 
Co. v. Celerity Sys., Inc., 752 N.Y.S.2d 301 (App. Div. 2002); Barton v. 
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The failure of a court to schedule a settlement conference 
required by CPLR 3408 does not speak to the reasons 
underlying the defendant’s failure to appear in an action and 
answer the plaintiff’s complaint.  Indeed, a defendant’s failure 
to appear and answer after being served with process, and the 
failure to participate in a settlement conference with the court, 
are two very different things.  A defendant seeking to vacate a 
default must establish a reasonable excuse for failing to appear 
and answer, which speaks to procedural obligations under the 
CPLR that are wholly independent of mandatory foreclosure 
settlement conferences. 
In any event, even if a defendant in a foreclosure action 
establishes a reasonable excuse for failing to appear that 
somehow relates to the court’s failure to schedule a settlement 
conference, the absence of the conference says nothing of the 
meritorious defense that must also be established for vacatur of 
the default.  Defenses, meritorious or otherwise, may be 
discussed at settlement conferences.  However, the absence of a 
conference itself is irrelevant to whether the defendant 
independently possesses a meritorious defense to a foreclosure 
action. 
Accordingly, it is unlikely that the inadvertent failure of a 
court to offer a settlement conference under CPLR 3408 affords 
a defaulted defendant any practical relief.  In the event that 
future defendants seek to vacate default judgments on the 
ground that they were not provided their mandatory 
settlement conference opportunity under the statute, it is 
predicted here that the vacatur of default judgments will be 
denied, unless such defendants can establish an entitlement to 
vacatur on other independent grounds. 
 
D. Whether the Settlement Conferences are Meaningful and 
Successful 
 
In its proper context, CPLR 3408 is, for defendants, 
actually a second bite at the settlement apple.  One of the 
provisions of the Subprime Residential Loan and Foreclosure 
Laws of 2008 is RPAPL 1304, which provides that, as a 
condition precedent to the commencement of a residential 
 
Executive Health Exam’rs, 716 N.Y.S.2d 3 (App. Div. 2000). 
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foreclosure action involving subprime, nontraditional, or high-
cost mortgages, the lender must send the borrower a default 
notice, at least ninety days before the commencement of the 
action.138  Such notices must advise the borrower that he or she 
is in danger of losing the home for non-payment, state the sum 
owed to cure the default, and list approved mortgage 
counseling agencies that are available in the area.139  The 
obvious purpose of encouraging borrowers to consult with 
mortgage counseling services is for those service providers to 
assist in exploring potential re-finance options that seek to 
avoid the necessity of foreclosure actions.  Foreclosure actions 
are commenced only against borrowers who fail to cure their 
defaults within the ninety-day notice period, with or without 
the assistance of a mortgage counselor.  The mandatory 
settlement conference contemplated by CPLR 3408 is, 
therefore, the second settlement opportunity provided to 
borrowers by the Subprime Residential Loan and Foreclosure 
Laws.  Any settlement that is reached at the conference should 
be memorialized in a clear, enforceable, written or transcribed 
agreement.140 
A perceived pitfall of CPLR 3408 is that, while the statute 
mandates a settlement conference in residential foreclosure 
actions, there is no mechanism, beyond the conference itself, 
assuring that any meaningful accomplishments will arise from 
the effort.  As noted, by the time of the conference, earlier 
settlement opportunities have, by definition, already failed.  It 
cannot be reasonably expected that all or even most of the 
conferences will lead to a resolution of foreclosure litigations.  
However, CPLR 3408 provides that any counsel appearing for 
the mandatory settlement conference ―shall be fully authorized 
to dispose of the case,‖141 likely written to help assure the 
 
138. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1304(1).  The notice is to be sent by 
the lender via registered or certified mail.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1304(2).  
Compliance with this and other laws must be affirmatively pleaded in the 
plaintiff’s complaint.  N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1302(1). 
139. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1304(1).  When foreclosure actions are 
commenced, further warnings and advice must be provided to the borrower 
with the summons and complaint, as set forth in RPAPL 1303.  See 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Taylor, 843 N.Y.S.2d 495, 498 (Sup. Ct. 
2007) (regarding a predecessor version of CPLR 1303). 
140. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2104.  Accord Bruce J. Bergman, Entertainment of 
Settlement Could Backfire on Lender, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 31, 2008, at 5. 
141. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(c). 
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seriousness and desired productivity of the conferences.  The 
recent amendments to CPLR 3408 include the statute’s new 
subdivision (f) that requires parties to negotiate in good faith at 
the settlement conferences,142 which may be of marginal 
practical solace.  Without doubt, the required residential 
foreclosure settlement conferences add to the workload of an 
already-overburdened judiciary.  Each judge throughout the 
state may handle the conferences differently: either in 
chambers or in open court, on motion days or in special session, 
personally or through a law secretary, with or without 
meaningful negotiation.143  The value of the conference will 
depend in any given instance upon a variety of factors 
including the facts of the case, the goals and reasonableness of 
the parties, and the negotiating experience and quality of the 
assigned judge and counsel. 
While the New York State Office of Court Administration 
(―OCA‖) does not compile statewide foreclosure settlement 
conference statistics, it does capture statistical information for 
the larger counties in the greater New York City area.144  
Statistics for the period between approximately January 1, 
2009 and September 30, 2009145 reveal the following:146 
 
 
142. 2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 507, § 9(f) (McKinney). 
143. See Tolchinsky & Wertheim, supra note 13, at 3. 
144. E-mail from Paul Lewis, Esq., Office of Court Administration, to 
author (Oct. 20, 2009). 
145. According to the OCA, different counties began keeping records and 
implementing procedures at different times, and the sixty-day conference 
period meant that the earliest conferences were not conducted until 
approximately January of 2009. 
146. The statistics for Queens, Kings, Richmond, Bronx, Nassau, and 
Suffolk Counties were provided by the OCA via e-mail on October 20, 2009.  
The statistics for Westchester County were separately provided via e-mail by 
Nancy Barry, Esq., dated October 26, 2009. 
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 Conferences 
Scheduled 
Conferences 
Held 
Defaults in 
Appearance 
Settlements 
Reached 
Queens 1,871 1,130 768 83 
Kings 1852 1300 552 82 
Richmond 476 295 181 47 
Bronx 1173 762 411 109 
Nassau 2621 1390 1231 101 
Suffolk 2181 622 1559 84 
Westchester 1075 861 214 46 
 
The statistics establish that for the settlement conferences 
that were scheduled, defendants failed to appear at scheduled 
settlement conferences between 19.9% (Westchester County) 
and 47% (Nassau County) of the time, with one aberrational 
exception where the default rate was 71.5% (Suffolk County).  
The mandatory settlement conference concept, therefore, 
provides no practical benefit to a significant portion of 
residential foreclosure cases, where the defendants fail to 
appear and participate. 
The statistics also establish that, for the conferences 
attended by the parties, the settlement rate was 16% in 
Richmond County, 14% in Bronx County, 13.5% in Suffolk 
County, 7.5% in Queens County, 7.3% in Nassau County, 6.3% 
in Kings County, and 5.3% in Westchester County.  When 
defaults are taken into account, the settlement rates for all 
cases scheduled for conferences drops to 10% in Richmond 
County, 9.3% in Bronx County, 4.4% in Queens and Kings 
Counties, 4.3% in Westchester County, and 3.9% in Nassau 
and Suffolk Counties.  The success rate might appear modest 
in terms of overall percentages, but it is significant to the 
several hundreds of families whose homes were spared as a 
result of the settlement efforts overseen by the courts. 
As a practical matter, settlements will not occur unless 
both parties are truly interested in reaching an arrangement 
that saves the borrower’s home while meeting the legitimate 
financial interests of the lender.  Settlements will also prove 
impossible when a borrower’s financial circumstances have 
declined to where a proposed restructured payment schedule is 
not viable for the borrower.  Typically, settlements will not be 
reached during the initial conference between the court and the 
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parties, as the borrower must often provide further information 
to assist the lender in calculating an offer that restructures 
mortgage payments.  The parties must, therefore, appear at the 
court on two or three occasions before any settlement can be 
finalized.  The need for multiple conferences means that the 
statistics for settlements will often lag behind the statistics of 
the conferences that are shown to have been scheduled.  
Statistics maintained by certain counties reveal that the rate of 
adjournments is 73% in Nassau County, 66.3% in Westchester 
County, and 60% in Queens County.147  The settlement success 
rate should be expected to ultimately exceed the current 
reported statistics, as these statistics do not reflect the 
significant number of cases for which scheduled settlement 
conferences have been adjourned or for continuing conferences 
that have not yet run their course. 
Two authors on the subject suggest that CPLR 3408 could 
be rendered more meaningful if the settlement conference 
included a mediation component,148 akin to that required under 
New Jersey’s statewide Mortgage Stabilization and Relief 
Act149 and the Housing Assistance and Recovery Program150 
that became effective on January 9, 2009.151  In New Jersey, 
lenders that have commenced residential mortgage foreclosure 
actions are subject to a six-month forbearance period that 
prohibits efforts to remove the borrower from the property, 
during which time the lender and borrower are to participate in 
a non-binding court-sponsored mediation program.152 
 
147. Statistics provided by the OCA via e-mail on October 20, 2009 for 
Queens, Kings, Richmond, Bronx, Nassau, and Suffolk Counties.  
Westchester statistics separately provided via e-mail by Nancy Barry, Esq., 
dated October 26, 2009. 
148. Tolchinsky & Wertheim, supra note 13. 
149. 2008 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 127 (West) (codified at N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 55:14K-1 to -82 (West 2009)). 
150. 2008 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 127, §§ 9-14 (West) (codified at N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 55:14K-88 to -93). 
151. 2008 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 127 (West). 
152. See Assembly Appropriations Committee Statement, N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 55:14K-82 (West 2009).  The concept of a forbearance period is being 
considered in the New York State Legislature.  As of this writing, a bill is 
pending in the New York Assembly—A06756—which will, if enacted, amend 
RPAPL 1304 to impose a one-year foreclosure moratorium between the time 
the lender proves entitlement to a judgment and the court order that 
transfers title.  The proposed legislation is expressly subject to a three-year 
sunset provision.  No corresponding bill yet appears to be pending in the New 
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Another neighboring state, Connecticut, offers foreclosure 
litigants a mediation option as well.153  Complaints in 
residential foreclosure actions must attach a notice form by 
which the borrower may request mediation.154  The Connecticut 
court has three days from receipt of the request to notify the 
parties of the mediation,155 which is to be held within fifteen 
days of its noticed scheduling156 and completed within sixty 
days of the ―return date‖ of the foreclosure action.157  The State 
of Connecticut appropriated $2 million to fund its mediation 
program.158 
 
IV. The Appointment of Counsel for Those in Need 
 
The intended importance of the foreclosure settlement 
conference is underscored by CPLR 3408(b), which provides 
that any defendant appearing for the conference pro se is 
―deemed‖ to have made an application for the appointment of 
counsel as a poor person.159  In other words, the statute 
contains a legal presumption that an unrepresented defendant 
is a poor person seeking the appointment of counsel.  The 
application for counsel invokes CPLR 1101.160  CPLR 1101(a) 
requires, as a matter of procedure, that the pro se parties 
seeking assigned counsel file an affidavit setting forth their 
amount and sources of income, a listing of property owned and 
its value(s), their inability to pay the expenses of the litigation, 
the facts and nature of the action, and whether any other 
person who has a beneficial interest in the action is also unable 
to assist with litigation expenses.161  The counsel provisions of 
CPLR 3408(b) and 1101(a) have the practical effect of requiring 
 
York State Senate.  See generally New York State Assembly, A06756 
Summary, http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A06756 (last visited Feb. 15, 
2010). 
153. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-31l; 49-31m (2008). 
154. Id. § 49-31l(c)(1). 
155. Id. §§ 49-31l(c)(2); 49-31n(b)(1). 
156. Id. § 49-31n(b)(2). 
157. Id. § 49-31n(c)(1). 
158. See N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS. Report, supra note 11, at 9-10. 
159. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(b) (McKinney 2009). 
160. Id. 
161. See generally Teeter v. Reed, 395 N.Y.S.2d 282 (App. Div. 1977); In 
re S. Tier Legal Servs., 420 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Sup. Ct. 1979). 
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the court to make available in the courtroom the necessary 
forms that must be filled out for the pro se applicant to 
potentially meet the requirements for the appointment of 
counsel. 
The court has discretion to grant or deny applications for 
appointed counsel.162  Presumably, foreclosure defendants who 
receive appointed counsel would be entitled to the related 
benefits of CPLR 1102 that attach upon the appointment of 
counsel, such as the county’s payment of stenographic 
transcript expenses and the waiver of court costs.163 
When a defendant’s application for assigned counsel is 
granted at the mandatory settlement conference, CPLR 3408(b) 
directs that the conference be continued on a later date for the 
appearance and participation of the assigned attorney.164  The 
availability of a mechanism for the appointment of counsel to 
eligible defendants is significant.  Defendants subject to 
foreclosure upon the subprime, high-cost, and nontraditional 
mortgages contemplated by CPLR 3408 are likely to 
disproportionally represent poor and minority households.165 
However, while CPLR 3408(b) created a statutory right to 
assigned counsel in covered mortgage foreclosure actions, the 
statute did not provide any underlying funding of assigned 
counsel.  The statutory amendments enacted in 2009 likewise 
contain no funding for assigned counsel, and in fact declared 
the amendments to be revenue-neutral.166  Courts that find 
 
162. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1101(a).  See also Smith v. Smith, 2 N.Y.2d 120 
(1956); Abbott v. Conway, 539 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1989); Bridges v. 
Univ. of Rochester, 468 N.Y.S.2d 732 (App. Div. 1983); Howell v. Francesco, 
738 N.Y.S.2d 168 (Civ. Ct. 2001). 
163. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1102(b), (d).  Conceivably, foreclosure actions within 
the jurisdictional limits of the Civil Courts could be brought in such courts, 
see Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 7B, 
CPLR C3408; N.Y. City Civ. Ct. Act 203, in which case the city would 
presumably assume expenses for stenographic transcripts.  See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 
1102(a). 
164. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(b). 
165. Powell & Roberts, supra note 10; Fernandez, supra note 10. 
166. New York State Senate, S66007: Relates to home mortgage loans, 
the crime of mortgage fraud, and appropriations to the NYS housing trust 
fund corporation, http://open.nysenate.gov/openleg/api/1.0/html/bill/S66007 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (―BUDGET IMPLICATIONS: This bill will not 
have an impact on State finances.‖); New York State Assembly, Summary – 
A40007, http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A40007 (last visited Feb. 15, 
2010) (―BUDGET IMPLICATIONS: This bill will not have an impact on State 
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defendants eligible for assigned counsel, therefore, refer 
defendants to legal service organizations, bar associations, and 
lists of available pro se attorneys, but there is no guarantee 
that such referrals will actually result in attorney-client 
representation.  The Brennan Center for Justice at New York 
University School of Law found that in Queens County between 
November 2008 and May 2009, 84% of defendants in 
foreclosure actions involving subprime, high-cost, and 
nontraditional mortgages were without full legal 
representation.167  The figures for Richmond and Nassau 
Counties were estimated by the OCA as 91% and 92%, 
respectively.168  These figures are not fully representative of 
reality, as they do not include instances of legal representation 
for ―incidental‖ or ―additional‖ defendants, nor do they account 
for the many defendants who default by failing to answer 
plaintiffs’ complaints or who fail to attend the settlement 
conferences,169 thereby skewing the percentages higher.  The 
figures may also include pro se defendants who requested 
assigned counsel but were found to be ineligible for it. 
The more accurate method of gauging the level of attorney 
representation at mandated residential foreclosure settlement 
conferences is to examine the number of cases where attorneys 
appear on behalf of defendants at conferences that are actually 
conducted.  Recent OCA figures for Queens County (current to 
October 1, 2009) demonstrate that attorneys appeared on 
behalf of defendants in 570 of the 1,103 conferences that were 
conducted, representing 51.7% of those conferences.170  
Nevertheless, the percentages suggest that CPLR 3408(b) may 
not be sufficiently meeting its stated overall mission of 
providing legal representation to defendants facing the loss of 
their homes as a result of subprime, high-cost, and non-
traditional mortgage foreclosures. 
The counsel provision in CPLR 3408 is important, 
considering that the vast majority of foreclosure plaintiffs are 
 
finances.‖). 
167. CLARK & BARRON, supra note 16, at 14. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 14 n.66. 
170. Statistics provided by the OCA by e-mail on October 20, 2009 for 
Queens County, compiled from the Foreclosure Settlement Conference Part 
from October 2, 2008 to October 1, 2009. 
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institutions that commence the litigations through counsel.  
One responsibility of all attorneys is to assure a good faith 
basis for the actions they commence.171  Moreover, once 
foreclosure actions are commenced, the lenders’ attorneys often 
fast-track the litigations with motions for summary judgment 
under CPLR 3212.  Appellate cases are legion that lenders 
establish their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment 
merely by evidencing to the court the mortgage, the unpaid 
note, and the borrower’s default.172  Since it is not uncommon 
 
171. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 130-1.1a (2007). 
172. See, e.g., Emigrant Mortgage Co., Inc. v. Turk, 895 N.Y.S.2d 722 
(App. Div. 2010); Cassara v. Wynn, 864 N.Y.S.2d 362 (App. Div. 2008), leave 
to appeal dismissed, 874 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2009); Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. 
Delphonse, 883 N.Y.S.2d 135 (App. Div. 2009); Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A. v. 
O’Connor, 880 N.Y.S.2d 696 (App. Div. 2009); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. 
Webster, 877 N.Y.S.2d 200 (App. Div. 2009); Yildiz v. Vural Mgmt. Corp., 877 
N.Y.S.2d 466 (App. Div. 2009); Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Thomas, 862 
N.Y.S.2d 89 (App. Div. 2008); Rose v. Levine, 861 N.Y.S.2d 374 (App. Div. 
2008); Popular Fin. Servs., LLC v. Williams, 855 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 
2008); US Bank Nat’l Ass’n Tr. U/S 6/01/08 (Home Equity Home Trust 1998-
2) v. Alvarez, 854 N.Y.S.2d 171 (App. Div. 2008); Charter One Bank, FSB v. 
Leone, 845 N.Y.S.2d 513 (App. Div. 2007); Aames Funding Corp. v. Houston, 
843 N.Y.S.2d 660 (App. Div. 2007); Red Tulip, LLC v. Neiva, 842 N.Y.S.2d 1, 
5 (App. Div. 2007); Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A. v. Mastropaolo, 837 
N.Y.S.2d 247, 251-52 (App. Div. 2007); Daniel Perla Assocs. v. 101 Kent 
Assocs., 836 N.Y.S.2d 630 (App. Div. 2007); Witelson v. Jamaica Estates 
Holding Corp. I, 835 N.Y.S.2d 179 (App. Div. 2007); Cochran Inv. Co. v. 
Jackson, 834 N.Y.S.2d 198 (App. Div. 2007); Marculescu v. Ovanez, 815 
N.Y.S.2d 598 (App. Div. 2006); Campaign v. Barba, 805 N.Y.S.2d 86 (App. 
Div. 2005); NC Venture I, L.P. v. Complete Analysis, Inc., 803 N.Y.S.2d 95, 
98 (App. Div. 2005); Household Fin. Realty Corp. of N.Y. v. Winn, 796 
N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 2005); LPP Mortgage, Ltd. v. Card Corp., 793 
N.Y.S.2d 346 (App. Div. 2005); Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Olasov, 793 N.Y.S.2d 52 
(App. Div. 2005); U.S. Bank Trust N.A. v. Butti, 792 N.Y.S.2d 505 (App. Div. 
2005); Larkville Manor, Inc. v. KBK Enters., LLC, 772 N.Y.S.2d 591 (App. 
Div. 2004); Coppa v. Fabozzi, 773 N.Y.S.2d 604 (App. Div. 2004); Republic 
Nat’l Bank of N.Y. v. O’Kane, 764 N.Y.S.2d 635 (App. Div. 2003); Marshall v. 
Alaliewie, 757 N.Y.S.2d 162, 163 (App. Div. 2003); Tower Funding, Ltd. v. 
David Berry Realty, Inc., 755 N.Y.S.2d 413 (App. Div. 2003); M&T Mortgage 
Corp. v. Ethridge, 751 N.Y.S.2d 741 (App. Div. 2002); Credit-Based Asset 
Servicing & Securitization, LLC v. Grimmer, 750 N.Y.S.2d 673 (App. Div. 
2002); EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Riverdale Assocs., 737 N.Y.S.2d 114 (App. Div. 
2002); Fleet Bank v. Pine Knoll Corp., 736 N.Y.S.2d 737, 739 (App. Div. 
2002); IMC Mortgage Co. v. Griggs, 733 N.Y.S.2d 918 (App. Div. 2001); 
Schantz v. O’Sullivan, 731 N.Y.S.2d 808 (App. Div. 2001); Paterson v. 
Rodney, 727 N.Y.S.2d 333 (App. Div. 2001); Sansone v. Cavallaro, 727 
N.Y.S.2d 516 (App. Div. 2001); United Companies Lending Corp. v. Hingos, 
724 N.Y.S.2d 134, 135 (App. Div. 2001); Republic Nat’l Bank of N.Y. v. Zito, 
721 N.Y.S.2d 244 (App. Div. 2001); Simoni v. Time-Line, Ltd., 708 N.Y.S.2d 
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for financial institutions to sell and assign mortgages and 
notes, a plaintiff that is an assignee must also tender evidence 
that it received the mortgage and note by a proper prior 
assignment.173  The plaintiff’s initial burden is not particularly 
difficult for institutional lenders to meet since it relies on 
readily-accessible documentation.  Once the plaintiff’s prima 
facie burden is met, the burden shifts to the borrower 
defendant to establish, through admissible evidence, the 
existence of a triable issue of fact as a defense to the action,174 
 
142 (App. Div. 2000); Delta Funding Corp. v. Yaede, 702 N.Y.S.2d 854 (App. 
Div. 2000); Sinardi v. Rivera, 689 N.Y.S.2d 236 (App. Div. 1999); First Union 
Nat’l Bank v. Weston, 689 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545 (App. Div. 1999); Hoffman v. 
Kraus, 688 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576 (App. Div. 1999); Mahopac Nat’l Bank v. 
Baisley, 664 N.Y.S.2d 345 (App. Div. 1997); Bercy Investors, Inc. v. Sun, 657 
N.Y.S.2d 47 (App. Div. 1997); Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. 
Karastathis, 655 N.Y.S.2d 631 (App. Div. 1997); Chem. Bank v. Bowers, 643 
N.Y.S.2d 653 (App. Div.1996); DiNardo v. Patcam Serv. Station, Inc., 644 
N.Y.S.2d 779 (App. Div. 1996); N. Fork Bank v. Hamptons Mist Mgmt. Corp., 
639 N.Y.S.2d 452 (App. Div.1996); Home Sav. Bank v. Schorr Bros. Dev. 
Corp., 624 N.Y.S.2d 53 (App. Div. 1995); Governor & Co. of the Bank of 
Ireland v. Dromoland Castle Ltd., 624 N.Y.S.2d 855 (App. Div. 1995); Zitel 
Corp. v. Fonar Corp., 619 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Div. 1994); Vill. Bank v. Wild 
Oaks Holding, Inc., 601 N.Y.S.2d 940 (App. Div. 1993); Silber v. Muschel, 593 
N.Y.S.2d 306 (App. Div. 1993); Metro. Distrib. Servs. v. DiLascio, 574 
N.Y.S.2d 755 (App. Div. 1991); Marton Asss. v. Vitale, 568 N.Y.S.2d 119, 121 
(App. Div. 1991); Gateway State Bank v. Shangri-La Private Club for 
Women, 493 N.Y.S.2d 226 (App. Div. 1985), aff’d, 67 N.Y.2d 627 (1986). 
173. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 13-105 (McKinney 2009).  See also 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Marchione, 887 N.Y.S.2d 615 (App. Div. 2009); 
LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ahearn, 875 N.Y.S.2d 595, 597 (App. Div. 2009); 
Bankers Trust Co. v. Hoovis, 694 N.Y.S.2d 245, 247 (App. Div. 1999); 20 East 
17th St. LLC v. 4 M Dev. Co., 666 N.Y.S.2d 912 (App. Div. 1998); Kluge v. 
Fugazy, 536 N.Y.S.2d 92 (App. Div. 1988); Bercy Investors, Inc. v. Sun, 657 
N.Y.S.2d 47 (App. Div. 1997); RCR Servs. Inc. v. Herbil Holding Co., 645 
N.Y.S.2d 76 (App. Div. 1996); Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Taylor, 843 
N.Y.S.2d 495, 497 (Sup. Ct. 2007). 
174. See Nassau Trust Co. v. Montrose Concrete Prods. Corp., 436 
N.E.2d 1265 (N.Y. 1982); State Bank of Albany v. Fioravanti, 417 N.E.2d 60 
(N.Y. 1980); HSBC Bank USA v. Merrill, 830 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (App. Div. 
2007); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Ajuda, 730 N.Y.S.2d 871 (App. Div. 2000); 
Rose, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 374; Alvarez, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 171; Leone, 845 N.Y.S.2d 
at 513; Neiva, 842 N.Y.S.2d at 6; Houston, 843 N.Y.S.2d at 660; Jackson, 833 
N.Y.S.2d at 542; LaSalle Bank N.A. v. Kosarovich, 820 N.Y.S.2d 144, 145 
(App. Div. 2006); Household Fin. Realty Corp. of N.Y. v. Winn, 796 N.Y.S.2d 
533 (App. Div. 2005); Olasov, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 52; Butti, 792 N.Y.S.2d at 505; 
Marshall, 757 N.Y.S. at 163; Etheridge, 751 N.Y.S.2d at 741-42; EMC 
Mortgage Corp., 737 N.Y.S.2d at 114; Fleet Bank, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 739; 
Schantz, 731 N.Y.S.2d 808-09; Paterson, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 333; Sansone, 727 
N.Y.S.2d at 517; Hingos, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 135; Credit Based Asset Servicing & 
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such as, but not limited to, waiver, estoppel, bad faith, fraud, or 
oppressive or unconscionable conduct on the part of the 
plaintiff.175  Counsel can be of crucial importance to defendants 
in navigating the summary judgment process. 
The benefits of having counsel at foreclosure settlement 
conferences are also easy to imagine.  Attorneys may advise 
defendants of potential legal defenses specifically related to, 
inter alia, the federal Truth in Lending Act (―TILA‖),176 the 
 
Securitization v. Castelli, 711 N.Y.S.2d 624, 625 (App. Div. 2000); Simoni, 
708 N.Y.S.2d at 142; Weston, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 544; Green Point Sav. Bank v. 
Spivey, 676 N.Y.S.2d 228 (App. Div. 1998); Trustco Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. 
Labriola, 667 N.Y.S.2d 450 (App. Div. 1998); Baisley, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 346; 
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Fed. Bank & Trust, FSB v. Siegel, 669 N.Y.S.2d 334 (App. Div. 1998); 
Horowitz v. Griggs, 666 N.Y.S.2d 480 (App. Div. 1997); First Trust Nat’l 
Ass’n v. Chiang, 662 N.Y.S.2d 136 (App. Div. 1997); HSBC Bank USA v. 
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Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (―RESPA‖)177 and 
bankruptcy laws, the New York State Home Equity Theft 
Protection Act178 and Deceptive Practices Act,179 and statutory 
 
Picarelli, 889 N.Y.S.2d 882, No. 51107(U), 2009 WL 1585773 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 
14, 2009) (unreported disposition); LaSalle Bank, NA v. Shearon, 881 
N.Y.S.2d 599, 602 (Sup. Ct. 2009); Sutherland v. Remax 2000, 20 Misc.3d 
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N.Y.S.2d 56, No. 51793(U), 2007 WL 2768915 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 29, 2007) 
(unreported disposition); Beneficial Homeowner Serv. Corp. v. Butler, 836 
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(2009).  See generally Fremont Inv. & Loan v. Haley, 889 N.Y.S.2d 505, No. 
135592007, 2009 WL 1636915 (Sup. Ct. June 11, 2009) (unreported 
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2008 WL 5191428 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 12, 2008) (unreported disposition); 
Sutherland v. Remax 2000, 20 Misc.3d 1131(A), No. 22405/2007, 2008 WL 
3307201 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 7, 2008) (unreported disposition); Bankers Trust v. 
McFarland, 743 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 2002). 
178. Home Equity Theft Protection Act, 2006 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 308 
(codified as amended at N.Y. BANKING LAW § 595-a (McKinney 2009)); N.Y. 
REAL PROP. LAW § 265-a).  The law is intended to protect homeowners in 
financial distress—particularly those who are poor, elderly, or financially 
unsophisticated—from selling their home equity for a fraction of its fair 
market value as a result of misrepresentations, deceit, intimidation, or other 
unreasonable commercial practices by equity purchasers.  N.Y. REAL PROP. 
LAW § 265-a(1)(a).  The statute provides that the terms and conditions of 
equity purchases be set forth in written agreements that must conform with 
statutory requirements regarding print size, the identity of parties, the 
consideration recited, the description of the mortgaged property, terms of 
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Id. § 265-a(3)-(7).  Non-compliance with the provisions of RPL 265-a 
precludes equity purchasers from obtaining or enforcing judgments of 
foreclosure and sale for the property.  See First Nat’l Bank of Chicago v. 
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protections against high-cost home loans,180 and may help 
renegotiate payment terms and assure that relevant legal 
procedures are followed.181 
The availability of appointed counsel, of course, implicates 
federal and state funding for assigned legal services.  An 
editorial published in the New York Times on October 9, 2009, 
lamented that funding for assigned counsel in home foreclosure 
litigations is not adequate and urged higher state and federal 
funding of programs earmarked for that purpose.182  A bill has 
been introduced in the New York State Assembly—A00464—
which, if enacted, will expand defendants’ rights to assigned 
counsel.183  A corresponding bill has yet to be sponsored in the 
New York State Senate, and, given New York’s well-publicized 
budget difficulties, the future funding of assigned counsel in 
mortgage foreclosure actions may prove problematic. 
Pro bono legal services are necessary to the success of 
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WL 1425247 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 9, 2009) (unreported disposition). 
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N.E.2d 741 (N.Y. 1995); Negrin v. Norwest Mortgage, 700 N.Y.S.2d 184 (App. 
Div. 1999), and has been raised in mortgage foreclosure actions wherein the 
loan is alleged to be predatory.  See generally Delta Funding Corp. v. 
Murdaugh, 774 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 2004); Schimenti v. Whitman & 
Ransom, 617 N.Y.S.2d 742 (App. Div. 1994); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. 
Robinson, 25 Misc.3d 1211(A), No. 52029(U), 2009 WL 3210306 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Oct. 7, 2009); Cruz v. HSBC Bank, N.A., 21 Misc.3d 1143(A), No. 5191428, 
2008 WL 5191428, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 12, 2008) (unreported 
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180. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-l(1) (McKinney 2009). 
181. See CLARK & BARRON, supra note 16, at 17-25. 
182. Editorial, Another Kind of Foreclosure Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 
2009, at A30.  See also CLARK & BARRON, supra note 16, at 28-30. 
183. New York State Assembly, Summary - A00464, 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A00464 (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
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CPLR 3408 in its current form.  The New York City Bar 
Association (―NYCBA‖) and the Federal Reserve Bank have co-
sponsored the Lawyers’ Foreclosure Intervention Network 
(―LFIN‖), which provides pro bono legal services for low-income 
homeowners facing foreclosure.184  The program, administered 
by the NYCBA, trains volunteer attorneys to assist 
homeowners in (1) assessing their options, (2) negotiating their 
re-finance arrangements, and (3) defending their cases.185  A 
similar program, the Mortgage Foreclosure Pro Bono Project, 
has been established in Nassau County through the 
collaboration of the County, the Attorney General’s office, and 
Nassau/Suffolk Legal Services.186  This program provides pro 
bono consultation services for homeowners in need.187  Pro bono 
services will become less necessary only to the extent that the 
state finds funding for the increased demand for assigned 
counsel generated by the enactment of CPLR 3408. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The latter part of 2008, along with 2009 and 2010, 
represent uncertain economic times.  The burst of the ―housing 
bubble‖ has been acknowledged as a significant factor in the 
downturn of the national economy.188  The increase in mortgage 
foreclosures is a sign of the distressed housing market, and it 
impedes any recovery of that market specifically and the 
economy generally.  Statutes that help reduce the number of 
foreclosure auctions and keep families in their homes can, 
theoretically, if not in fact, help stabilize the housing market 
and help families and communities. 
CPLR 3408 provides a settlement conference mechanism to 
 
184. N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS. Report, supra note 11, at 5.  See 
also Foreclosure Project: Overview, 
http://www.nycbar.org/citybarjusticecenter/projects/economic-
justice/foreclosure-project/overview (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). 
185. N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS. Report, supra note 11, at 5. 
186. Id. at 6. 
187. Nassau County Bar Association, Legal Services, Mortgage 
Foreclosure Legal Consultation Clinics, 
http://www.nassaubar.org/For%20The%20Public/Legal_Services.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2010). 
188. See, e.g., Steven Gjerstad & Vernon L. Smith, From Bubble to 
Depression?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2009, at A15. 
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help achieve a laudable goal.  It is the responsibility of the 
courts to properly navigate any procedural pitfalls presented by 
the statute’s draftsmanship, such as issues involving the filing 
of proofs of service and RJIs, and to implement the purpose and 
intent of CPLR 3408 to the best extent possible.  The 
availability and funding of assigned attorneys for financially-
strapped defendants remains, as of this writing, a continuing 
problem.  The courts’ greatest contributions with regard to 
CPLR 3408 will be the expected investment of serious, 
proactive time and effort in the settlement conferences 
themselves, to restructure payment terms in a manner that is 
acceptable to all parties and that keeps families in their homes.  
This is true even if the rate of settlements arising out of the 
mandated conferences remains in the modest 5.3% to 16% 
range. 
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